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Volume 5, Number 1 — March 2017
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CIVITAS GENTIUM

Volume 5, Number 1 — March 2017

Special Issue

Geopolitical Realities in the Greece-Cyprus Dipole
Solutions and alibis

Athens, March 2017
Civitas Gentium is a peer-reviewed annual e-journal of the Department of Turkish Studies and Modern Asian Studies of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens published on http://cg.turkmas.uoa.gr.

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Short Papers, of no more than 5,000 words (including an informative abstract of about 200 words in the language of the paper and in English, up to 8 keywords, as well as footnotes and references) will receive expedited review by at least two reviewers. Authors whose papers are accepted are expected to submit final versions, complying with the correction(s) and suggestion(s) of the reviewers and/or the editorial board, within four weeks of notification. Long Papers, exceeding 5,000 words will receive standard review. These submissions should normally not exceed 12,000 words (including an informative abstract of about 250 words in the language of the paper and in English, up to 10 keywords, as well as endnotes and references). Authors whose papers are accepted are expected to submit final versions, complying with the correction(s) and suggestion(s) of the reviewers and/or the editorial board, within six weeks of notification. Papers related to theoretical research or elaborating on already existing theory may be included in a special, "Theoretical Approaches" section. Such contributions should clearly define the scientific methodology adopted, in the introduction. Book Reviews section: Includes book reviews, or suggestion for reviews. For submissions, please contact the Journal Editor. Publishers may also submit two copies of books for review directly to the postal address of the journal. Letters to the Editor: This section includes statements of opinion on issues relevant to the readership, as well as discussions on previously published contributions. Submissions may not exceed 500 words. The Editor and the editorial board will evaluate the appropriateness of these contributions for inclusion.

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GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES IN THE GREECE-CYPRUS DIPOLE
SOLUTIONS AND ALIBIS

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Translated by Ioannis E. Kotoulas, Ph.D.

From the original:

To those who still think
To those who still care
To those who do not forget
To Cyprus
I.Th. Mazis

History offers no respite to countries that set aside their sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.

Henry Kissinger
World Order, Penguin Press, 2014

Summary: The study presents the absence of a thorough geopolitical analysis in Greece and Cyprus concerning national strategic planning in the Cyprus issue. The study shall focus initially on the general geopolitical rebalancing including i) the rise of Russian geopolitical dynamics in the Arctic Zone due to climate change, ii) power redistribution in the Greater Middle East in favor of Russia and China and against Turkey. Emphasis shall be also laid on the international crimes committed by Turkey. These crimes have not been properly put to light by Helladic and Cypriot side; nor were sanctions on Turkey by the international community raised as an issue, especially after the start of the talks between the President of the Cyprus Republic and the representative of the Turkish-Cypriot side. These acts and omissions of the Greek side deprive it from powerful advantages and equalize the victim of the aggression with the perpetrator. Under these circumstances talks between the Cyprus Republic and the ‘representatives’ of the occupied northern part of Cyprus lack any legitimization and lead to shrinking of Greek presence on the island. Demographic change caused by exogenous factors, such as the massive presence of settlers, can lead to the eradication of Greek presence. The aforementioned omission in coordinated strategic planning can be solved by the creation of a National Foundation of Geographical and Geopolitical Studies for the Mediterranean, as well as a Faculty of Geography and Geopolitics in a University of the Cyprus Republic supervised by the Cypriot Ministry of Education.
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FOREWORD FOR THE ENGLISH EDITION IN CIVITAS GENTIUM
Geopolitics in the Fourth Pillar: Culture, Ideology, Identities

Presentation of Professor Dr I. Th. Mazis to the Scientific Day Conference/Workshop on “Russia, Greece and the Mediterranean: Contemporary geopolitical dynamics and perspectives of peace” (Friday, 9 December 2016), organization: i) The Laboratory of Geo-cultural Analyses of Wider Middle East & Turkey of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens ii) The Postgraduate Program “Geopolitical Analysis, Geostrategic Synthesis, Defense and International Security Studies” iii) The European Public Law Organization (EPLO) and iv) The Greek-Russian Club “Dialogos”

The use of this text as a Foreword and an introductory note in the study that forms a Geopolitical Analysis of the Helladic-Cypriot Dipole is based on its extensive analysis of the Russian factor. The geopolitical attitude of the Russian factor is of great interest after Donald J. Trump was elected 45th President of the US. Trump’s views on climatic change and their imprint on ice melting in the Arctic Ocean is a matter to be examined. Reversal of so-called globalization, heralded by Trump’s recent victory and championed by the previous four US Presidents (George Bush, George Bush Jr., Bill Clinton and Barak Hussein Obama), presents the reader with an interesting context concerning the following analysis.

I. Ideological and political trends in the Euro-American Dipole
An analysis of the Geopolitical Complex of the Euro-American Dipole using cultural identity as a geopolitical factor –part of the Cultural Pillar- provides us with a dynamic and evolving geopolitical field. This geopolitical field is based on common national cultural elements and is a rival of the internationalized bank system; the latter is not based on actual production, rather on an economic NATO named Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) handled in Europe by the German government.

i) Using the aforementioned economic finding as a base, we should note that the relations between the economic factor and the political-ideological factor have not been overlooked by any serious analyst or intellectual, even since the times of Karl Marx. Still, the nation-denying, cosmopolitan, neo-colonialist bank elites try to avoid this obvious relation in their political arguments, in an attempt to justify its views vis-à-vis the recent election results all over Europe that condemn its policy. Europe is no longer the respected Europe of Schmidt, D’Estaing, Brandt, Mitterrand and Karamanlis. The nations of Europe react to these cosmopolitan elites using as their weapon the only known medium, their national identities. These form the only axis that can protect their cultural, financial and social rights; national identities are the only protective framework that enables individualism of citizens in a geographical space which is historically connected to European citizens through their language, culture and memories. The so-called ‘multicultural’ modern version of German-dominated Europe and the financial attack against their dignity leads to resistance of European citizens. This point should help interpret recent election results in both Europe and the US.

ii) European nations realize that revival of Cold War mentalities, as introduced by the Democratic Party of the US, aims to preserve US hegemony –in cooperation with Berlin- vis-à-vis other financial actors whose power is not based on an artificial financial sector in the context of international markets, rather on real goods; such actors are Russia, China, Brazil and India. These rising markets endanger the dominance of the Euro-Atlantic bank system and therefore should be halted, either through the application of the Economic and Cultural Pillar or through the use of the Defense/Security Pillar. The numerous tools available include political destabilization manifested as migration flows that are incompatible with European cultural background. In this way a new proletariat is created that is easily controlled and can be used as a ‘reserve industrial army’.
Military attacks against Yugoslavia, decided by NATO in 1999, belong to the same strategic context, since they removed any possibility of cooperation between the Orthodox Balkan states and Russia. In such an event Russia could penetrate the Rimland –according to Spykman’s model- and obtain access to the Mediterranean. This was also the case with the War in Afghanistan, decided by a NATO Security Conference in 2001; again encircling of Russia was present in Western strategic thinking. Intervention in Iraq was also decided in a NATO conference in 2003, while the coup in Kiev belongs to the same category. The establishment of a new pro-Western government in Kiev after the coup was accepted by all Western states, although just a few hours before the coup the Foreign Ministers of France, Poland and Germany had appeared as guarantee keeping parts of a deal struck with the legitimate Ukrainian government. The NATO Security Conference of 2015 perceived Russia as an ‘invading force’ in Ukraine and acquitted the Western powers of all their responsibilities in the Ukrainian crisis.1

Further key points of recent events are the following:

1. Brexit has signaled the discomfort of European peoples against their forced cultural and identitarian erosion and an unconstitutional political framework, elevating the importance of migration for politics. Everyday British citizens rejected German-dominated Eurocratic elite control of conscience, financial sector and forced cultural transformation. Mainstream media and social networks accused the British people of ‘Islamophobia’, ‘xenophobia’ and ‘backwardness’, notions that can be easily discarded by a careful look in British society and politics.2 The German government is already researching modes of reprisals against the British for Brexit thereby endangering the whole European structure.

2. Recent US elections cast in doubt Washington’s Cold War policy, manifested by the Democratic administration of Obama-Clinton vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Trump’s campaign was centered on an ideological, political and social level on his opposing of radical Islam, on his critical view of migration flows and his rejection of Russophobia which was a main axis of the Obama-Clinton policy and of a possible Clinton presidency. Trump’s victory is connected to the matter of American cultural identity and the reaction of the American people against the negative consequences of ‘globalization’ which undermines financial and social structures in a neo-colonialist spirit. The Democratic Party needed Russophobia in order to take advantage of a still lingering anti-communism of the American voters. Still, such a policy was also connected to US debt which amounts to almost 20 trillion US dollars.3

3. The performance of Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the 2016 presidential elections amounted to 49.7% in the first election and 46.4% in the second election. The Freedom Party shall in all probability be first in the coming parliamentary elections in 2017. FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer emphasized the dangers of radical Islam and mass migration for Austrian society, thus highlighting the importance of national and cultural identity.

Financial reality perceives the rise of Euro-skeptic political forces as a potential danger, especially in those countries that are directly connected to German bank capital, as Austria and Italy. According to the latest systemic risk counting Deutsche Bank seems to be one of the most important net contributor to systemic risks (third with a ratio of 1: 105, 29), while the relevant ratio of Lehman Brothers was 1:32. According to this data if Deutsche Bank was forced to liquidate just 1% of its loan portfolio, it would go bankrupt immediately. German Commerzbank is also a big net contributor (fifth, with a ratio of 1:70), as is the Italian UniCredit which actually owns the biggest Austrian bank, active also in the German bank sector.

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4. In Italy the overwhelming majority in the referendum of 5th December 2016 that rejected constitutional changes marks the growing disillusionment of European peoples with extreme neoliberal policies. Renzi did not manage to convince the Italian people that he can guarantee financial and social security, by opposing German financial policy and EU migration policy. In this case also, therefore, the common background consists of the national and cultural identity.

The prospect of an eruption of Deutsche Bank remains after the Italian referendum. The only bank in a worse state is the Belgian Dexia, which has already gone bankrupt, and the Italian Monte dei Paschi; both these banks form 20% of Deutsche Bank’s systemic risk. It is thus natural that German-dominated Eurocratic nation-denying usury elite is troubled, since a possible exit of Italy from Euro zone would signal the collapse of Deutsche Bank. Therefore, the existing Italian political system shall attempt to prevent an electoral victory of the Euro-skeptic party of Pepe Grillo who could possibly align with the Euro-skeptic Lega Nord. The Russian President Vladimir Putin in an interview to a Russian radio station (December 5, 2016) hailed the victory of NO in the referendum saying: ‘This is a victory that shall be remembered as a stand against globalization, as a cry of no, NO more’. Italian newspapers used the phrase ‘Putin wings big in Italy’ concerning the result of the referendum. Alexey Pushkov, a Russian MP, stated that defeat of the Renzi government could cause Italexit or an exit from the Euro zone and that the EU faces serious challenges.

5. The rise of Fillon as a candidate of the Centre-Right in France was actually made in order to avert a possible victory of Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French Presidential Elections. If Fillon after the scandal continues to be the candidate of the Centre-Right, then he will certainly use a great part of the ideological and political arguments cited by Le Pen during his fight against Front National, in order to reach victory according to the wishes of the French electorate. Fillon is a neoliberal and agrees with German hegemony. Le Pen differentiates on this matter adopting a state-centered financial view; therefore she has to be ‘eliminated’ as an adversary. Fillon’s choice to adopt a nation-centered and conservative view, focusing on migration and protection of French secular cultural identity and his rejection of Russophobia means that such views are shared by the majority of the French people; therefore he attempts to take electoral advantage of this situation and reduce the strength of Le Pen. France is the laboratory of Western philosophy and ideology and such a fundamental reorientation heralds important future changes that shall affect Greek political and ideological realities.

7. In the Netherlands the conservative far-right PVV (Freedom Party) shall probably be the first party in the 2017 general election; still it will not be able to form a government and shall remain the main opposition. PVV’s ideology and political views are centered on migration and cultural identity.

8. Finally, in Germany the upcoming elections in September 2017 it is expected that AfD, the anti-immigrationist party, shall be considerably strengthened; AfD is critical of the Islamization of Germany. Merkel’s proposal to ban burqa, as well as public acknowledgement of the failures of her migration and refugee policy during the Convention of CDU in December 2016 shows that the German society is also experiencing a shift in perceptions. AfD shall not be able to form a government; still it will rise to be an identitarian opposition.

In conclusion, we could argue that Europe and the US appear to move to the other end of the political pendulum, due to neoliberal and globalist politics. These politics are based on a deficit and bankrupt in-

ternational financial system that is not based on production of goods but on virtual bank products whose wide use leads inevitably to a global financial crisis and to war.

The Russian side seems to offer its support to an ideological conundrum of far-right parties (Netherlands), conservative parties (US, Austria, France) or activist nation-centered political forces (Italy); these political forces steadily increase their influence among European electorates. Benjamin Haddad, a French analyst at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank based in Washington, said that such policies point, in ways that might not be obvious to Americans, toward another agenda item of the ‘European populism’, as he characterizes it: partnering with Mr. Putin. “All over Europe, Putinism has emerged as an ideological alternative to globalism, the E.U., etc.,” Mr. Haddad said, with Mr. Putin seen as “a bulwark for conservative values — a strongman against gay marriage, immigration, Islam.” Mr. Haddad added, “It’s largely a domestic phenomenon, rather than the reflection of a strategic debate over the relationship with Moscow.”

Regarding the term ‘European populism’ I think it is misperceived. Decisions made by European peoples should be respected, instead of steadily using the term ‘populism’ for any electoral results that are not favorable to cosmopolitan elites in both Europe and the US. The new ideological landscape emerging in the West favors the rapprochement of the supra-systemic actors of Russia and the US, as well as a new Europe of nation-states.

II. The new Russian doctrine of foreign policy
Russia is moving to revise its doctrine of foreign policy which dates back to 2013. According to Le Monde (December 6, 2016) President Putin has issued a decree adopting the new doctrine. The text which measures 38 pages has largely been unnoticed in Western media; the text includes the term ‘safety’ seventy times and the term ‘threat’ twenty-five times. In the text the European Union is accused of ‘geopolitical expansion’ and of seeking jointly with the US ‘to undermine regional and global stability’. The new decree has erased a priority of the old doctrine which read as follows: ‘One of the main goals of Russia, a fundamental part of European civilization, in its foreign policy vis-à-vis the EU is to promote the creation of a financial and humanitarian space extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean’. This idea has been erased in the new edition, while notions of ‘systemic problems’ feature largely.

II.1 Military interventions
Russia’s priorities include strengthening of justice on an international level and opposition to military interventions that violate national sovereignty. According to the doctrine the Russian Federation is determined to avoid military interventions that violate international law, especially the principle of state sovereignty; interventions are replaced by the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’. Concerning the Middle East Russia shall continue to emphasize the need for a political and diplomatic solution of intra-state and inter-state disputes, without external interventions. Moscow wishes the solution of the Syrian Crisis based on the unity of its people and the territorial integrity of the country.

II.2 War against terrorism
According to the degree the main axis of the war on terrorism is the creation of an extended international coalition. Russia is opposed to the use of terrorist organizations by states for ideological, political or other

reasons, while it also condemns terrorism in all its forms, in the view that a terrorist act cannot be justified on any grounds, ideological, political, religious or other. Russia shall take all necessary precautions to prevent and fight terrorism, in order to protect the Russian people from acts of terror and in order to combat the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology.

II.3 Power as a factor
In the decree it is stated that the instability of political and financial systems has raised the importance of the factor of power. Upgrading and modernization of military equipment, creation and spread of new weapons’ systems undermine strategic stability, posing a new threat to international security which is based on agreements on weapons’ control. Although the prospect of a great war, as a nuclear war between hegemonic powers, is small, still the danger of involvement of these powers in regional conflicts is present. Russia favors the existing status of containment concerning development of nuclear weapons.

II.4 Struggle for dominion
According to the text the struggle for dominion is the prevalent trend in contemporary times. The US and its allies aim to reduce Russian power, while the political and financial pressure exerted on Russia undermines regional and global stability. According to the doctrine the UN is the center of control in international relations, while it is declared that Russia shall attempt to reinforce the mechanism of sanctions from the United Nations.

II.5 EU-Russia relations
The EU remains an important financial and political ally for Russia which favors a stable and predictable cooperation. Status of visa is a fundamental problem in EU-Russia relations and changes to that should improve cooperation.

II.6 NATO-Russia relations
Regarding NATO, Russia aims to build its relations with the Organization based on a framework of cooperation of equals. Still, NATO military activities near Russian borders create new points of tension and deepen existing ones.

II. 7 Russia and the media
Russia aims to promote its views in the media abroad, so as to provide the international public with objective information concerning Russia’s views on critical international matters or the situation in Russia’s interior.

III. Trump’s election and the possibility of an ideological and cultural shift of the geostrategic landscape
The election of the new American President is tuned with the new trends of the nations against ‘globalization’, as well as the views of the Russian Federation noted above. Trump’s campaign was based on the following principles:

a) Distancing US foreign policy from ‘millenial Trotskyist’ international interventions; shift of US strategic interests towards the Pacific Ocean based on US military power projection, not multinational financial power projection.

b) Abolishment of Russophobe syndromes and rapprochement in US-Russian relations with possible benevolent consequences on European financial activities after the embargo imposed by EU countries shall have been lifted.
iii) Redefining of NATO’s mission as a collective system of security under possible French hegemony and a major financial contribution by European countries.

iv) Creation of a Kurdish state, initially in Iraq and Syria.

v) Fight against Islamic radicalism, relevant terrorist activity and its international support.

vi) Financial containment of China in the American market, in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific Ocean.

The implementation of such a foreign policy shall bear important consequences on peace and security in the Mediterranean for the following reasons:

1. Fulfillment of points (a) and (b) shall create through lifting of embargo against Russia the possibility of Russian gas traversing Greek territory, as well as the preconditions necessary for important investments and thousands of jobs in the striving Greek financial sector.

1.1 Greece shall enjoy a strategic possibility to be another outlet of Russian hydrocarbons, in order to provide the markets of the EU. Such a fact shall offer an improvement in favor of Greece in the strategic equilibrium with Turkey, especially if the gas pipelines cross only Bulgarian and Greek territory. It should be noted that Bulgaria is also gradually reorienting itself towards Russia, after the election of Rumen Radev, former Chief of the Air Force of Bulgaria. Radev is not a member of a parliamentary party, but receives support from the Socialists, favors lifting of EU sanctions against Russia and having declared that Crimea is actually Russian.9

2. Gradual fulfillment of point (c) shall be combined with a French-German axis of strategic responsibility in the Mediterranean Sea, based on Germany on a financial level and on France on a military level. Berlin shall not limit itself to funding a new Eurocentric NATO, but shall attempt to participate actively in its military branch. This shall have unpredictable consequences for the EU and especially for some of its member-states, as Greece, Italy and Austria. France shall accept Germany’s involvement if it receives financial compensation, for example participation in Cyprus’ energy deposits, a growing influence in Egypt and in the Turkish market. Paris shall continue to be present in the Cyprus’ gas fields, as is today the case with TOTAL, while it shall aim to expand further its presence with new contracts. French influence in Egypt shall have to rely on harmonious bilateral relations with Russia which has already resumed its ties with Cairo. Concerning Turkish markets an arrangement with Germany is necessary, although there shall probably be implications. In conclusion, we could discern that Russia shall be actively engaged in the Cyprus and Egypt issue on a diplomatic level.

2.1 The security axis Paris-Berlin shall be complemented by the South Dipole Israel-Egypt. These two countries shall be focal points for the New Silk Road towards Europe; another focal point is Turkey through Iran and Azerbaijan and other countries in the Caucasus region. A new multi-polar hyper-system is being formed; one which the Mediterranean Hellenism in Greece and Cyprus should take note of, otherwise the Dipole Greece-Cyprus shall be turned into a space of geostrategic enhancement for Turkey in the New Silk Road and shall cease to exist on a cultural level, having been transformed in a cluster of Levantine societies without political liberties and identity. Therefore, the geostrategic orientation of Athens should be based on a comprehensive understanding of aforementioned geopolitical realities; these highlight the necessity of close ties and stable cooperation on all levels with the new South Dipole Israel-Egypt. Contribution of Greece includes participation in the axis of transportation for Israeli, Egyptian and Cypriot natural gas towards Europe (East-Med), as well as participation in the new defense structure of Eurocentric NATO and in the Mediterranean Sea in alignment with France, Russia and China. These axes of foreign policy are essential for the survival of the Greece-Cyprus Dipole.

2.2. In this context normalization of the conflict in Syria is essential. Syrian territory, along with Iran

and Turkey, belongs to the route of the New Silk Road. The Assad regime, aided by Russia, shall normalize its bilateral relations with Israel with possible Russian guarantees concerning Israeli security concerns, at least for a transitional phase before the new process has gained credibility. Russian-Israeli ties have been considerably strengthened in the latest period with official visits from both sides.

3. Concerning point (d), i.e. the creation of a Kurdish state entity in northern Syria, such a prospect could receive support exclusively from US and Israel. For the US the existence of a non-Semitic, national actor that shall project indirectly American power in this crucial part of the New Silk Road is essential; on the one hand a Kurdish state provides a power balance with Moscow and China, on the other hand it offers Israel its necessary strategic depth which is perceived as a sine qua non situation for its national security and its availability to protect US financial interests in the Gulf and in the South Eastern Mediterranean.

Moscow does not seem eager to support the establishment of a Kurdish state, in order not to alienate Iran – where a Kurdish minority of 8 million resides in the western part of Iranian territory and in proximity with Turkey and Iraq. This shall prove to be a point of strategic tension between the US and the Russian Federation, as this part of the Middle East controls on a geostrategic level the Eurasian Union, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO with its membership, as well as the new members of 2017 (India, Pakistan) covers one third of the New Silk Route. Imminent application of membership to SCO by Israel and Egypt is of special interest for our hypothesis. Therefore, a Great Kurdistan undermines not only the territorial integrity of old and new Russian allies (Syria, Iran, possibly Turkey), but also due to its alignment with the US redistributes power in this important international strategic axis of transportations forming a considerable choke point of trade flows and hydrocarbon flows, thus benefiting the US and its allies.

Fig. 1: The New Silk Road
[Source: https://www.merics.org/en/merics-analysis/infographichina-mapping/china-mapping/]
4. Concerning point (vi) we conclude based on the aforementioned remarks that this is a subject of tension between Russia and the US, so long as China remains a strategic ally of Moscow. As a final predictive conclusion we would state that:

a) The International Supra-System is evolving in a tri-polar system (US, Russia, China)

b) The International Supra-System shall recognize the international and regional role of Russia and China

c) The Mediterranean system shall be based on multiple Pillars (US, Russia, EU).

d) The geostrategic axis of the Mediterranean system shall include these sub-systemic dipoles: France-Germany, Greece-Cyprus (unless they commit major geostrategic mistakes) and Israel-Egypt, with Turkey being perceived as an unstable actor.

I. INTRODUCTION

An overview of the geostrategic ties between Greece and the Cyprus Republic demonstrates their considerable weakening over the last years, which in turn sends a dangerous message towards the international community and Turkey. We should note specifically the following:

The Common Defensive Doctrine of Greece and Cyprus, adopted in 1993, resulted in failure.
The S-300 missiles were ordered in 1996 by the Klerides government as an answer to the 1995 pur-
chase by Turkey of ATACMS missile system which was able to target Cyprus from the coast of Turkey. The S-300 missiles are now in Tympakion of Crete, where they remain.

The joint exercises Nikephoros-Toxotes are repeatedly postponed using as an excuse the postponing of Turkish exercise Bull. Such an argument is not based on a realist approach, if one considers just the geographical distance between Crete and Cyprus and between Cyprus and the Turkish coastline, as well as the Turkish occupation forces in the northern part of the island (43,000 soldiers) and the ongoing settlers’ wave from Turkey. The exercises that are carried out in cooperation with the US, the United Kingdom and Israel are useful in terms of international support; still the connection between the two parts of Hellenism cannot be properly substituted. This connection offers moral, psychological and operational abilities that shall remain even after the possible dissolution of contemporary balance.

II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL NETWORK

In a thorough analysis what is needed is a coherent geopolitical approach of the points of instability and stability in the SE Mediterranean in light of the general rebalancing of power caused by the following factors:

II.1 Ice melting in the Arctic.10

We should note the following as introductory remarks:

Ice melting in the Arctic is a phenomenon with considerable geopolitical and geostrategic consequences, which undermines the validity of the axioms held by Mackinder and Spykman.

Ice melting renders obsolete the power advantage enjoyed by the Anglo-Saxon, i.e. US, hegemony and reduces to a significant degree the geostrategic importance of Turkey for NATO and

Ice melting also reduces the diplomatic power of Turkey concerning the Cyprus issue solution.

Therefore, it is necessary to describe the geopolitical framework of the Arctic Zone and the geostrategic aspirations of Russia that emanate from this phenomenon. Proper understanding of the strategic goals of the Russian political elites is crucial for the creation of a coherent and successful diplomatic policy for Hellenism, in the fields of national independence and sovereignty concerning the two states of Hellenism (Greece and Cyprus). These methodological necessities lead us to the following detailed presentation of the existing geopolitical realities in the Arctic Zone and the subsequent Russian geostrategic planning.11

As noted above, ice melting in the Arctic12 is transforming the geostrategic importance of Turkey as a part of the Anglo-Saxon geostrategic zone known as Rimland vis-à-vis the Russian and in general the Eurasian landmass. Climate change and the geopolitical redistribution of power that is being observed in the Middle East in the last years have led us to note –already in September 2012- the following: “The Arctic Zone due to climate change and the intensifying ice melting is creating a new outlet for the trade flows of Russian goods that is shorter on a geographical and time level. This actually liberates Russia from the so-called ‘slavery to Rimland’, i.e. its dependence on the containing ring of landmass that prevented Russia from entering the ‘warm waters’ of the Mediterranean Sea. Russia is now able to transport its goods using this new route. We realize that in light of these events Turkey shall no longer have the same elevated geostrategic value for NATO and the axis Washington-London (Special Relationship), as a part of the Rimland that contained Russia. As a consequence, Turkey shall have to invent a new ‘geopo-

10. See Map 1.
11. See also I.P. Sotiropoulos, ‘The Arab-Muslim Uprisings as a Containment Phenomenon of Russia’, p. 142, 144, in I.Th. Mazis (ed.), The Arab Uprisings and the recreation of the Arab-Islamic World, Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Middle East, University of Athens, under the Direction of Professor Ioannis Th. Mazis, Leimon, Athens 2013 [in Greek].
12. See Map 3.
litical uniqueness’, able to provide a corresponding ‘geostrategic uniqueness’. In this context Turkey has discovered Neo-Ottomanism, in an attempt to control the Arab-Muslim and the Persian-Muslim world. This is the only way for Turkey to emerge as a necessary structural part of the Special Relationship axis and to become the leading power in the Middle East”.13

13. I.Th. Mazis, Interview to Savvas Iakovides, under the title (by the journalist) ‘Away from Turks and Muslims’, Simerini (Nicosia), 19 September 2012

Map 1: Reduction of ice sheets in the Arctic
[Source: http://arctic.atmos.uiuc.edu/cryosphere/]
Map 2: Three definitions of the Arctic (Polar Circle, 10°C isotherm, Treeline)

[Source: Alexandre Taithe, Isabelle Facon, Patrick Hébrard & Bruno Tertrais, “Arctique: perspectives stratégiques et militaires” Recherches & Documents N° 03/2013, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 8]
Overlapping sovereignty claims in the Arctic are being increasingly supported by more robust military presences in the High North. The listed bases are all those either within the Arctic Circle (above 66°33’ North) or close to it. Two (Resolute Bay and Nanisivik in Canada) are currently under construction. Keflavik International Airport is no longer a NATO base, but NATO aircraft tasked with maintaining Iceland’s air sovereignty utilise the facilities. Minimum sea ice extents are included to demonstrate how retreating sea ice is making two potential Arctic transport routes more accessible. Although the minimum extent in 2011 was greater than the record low of 2007, the trend has been consistently downward for the past few decades.

Map 3: Overlapping sovereignty claims in the Arctic

We have also explained that such a geostrategic aspiration by Ankara, i.e. to become the “leader of the Middle Eastern oil and gas deposits and therefore a hegemonic power […]” is based on various theoretical and practical errors and miscalculations in its perception"¹⁴ and is not feasible due to the following reasons:

1. Saudi Arabia, a country controlling the holy places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and in the subsoil of which the largest and most important, internationally, oil reserves are to be found, i.e. approximately 40 percent of the world’s crude oil [267 Gbbl, billion barrels, including the 2.5 Gbbl in the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone] shall not cede the hegemony of the Arab–Muslim world to a non–Arab state, which furthermore does not have any theological or economic precedence.

2. the Arab–Muslim world shall not accept to become the puppet of the Turkish element that is perceived as destroyers of the historical Caliphate.

3. Iran, i.e. the Shiite religious and political centre of the Greater Middle East shall not cede such a type of hegemony to the “Sunnis of Ankara”. This is even more so, considering that its hydrocarbon reserves are approximately 137.6 Gbbl, in other words it ranks fourth on a global level (10.3% of world reserves) and second to Saudi Arabia among the OPEC countries, in terms of proven crude oil reserves and that, its natural gas deposits are in the range of 1,045.7 trillion cubic feet, or 29.61 trillion cubic meters (i.e. approximately 15.8% of the international natural gas reserves). Consequently, it is the world’s second largest holder of natural gas reserves, below Russia.

4. Cairo, the renowned hearth of the Arab Caliphate with the Arab Fatimid Caliphs from 909 to 1171 and the Abbasid Caliphs from 1261 to 1517, i.e. a total of 518 years, given that the Ottoman dynasty held this seat for a smaller period, shall not accept Turkish supremacy.

In this context we had already noted in the same text on a geostrategic level that “[…] the Western world and especially the US would perceive in appositive way the abolition of European dependence on Arab-Muslim and Iranian hydrocarbons. A relevant example is the embargo decided by the EU and the US against Iranian hydrocarbon.¹⁵ The strategic importance of the planned corridor towards Europe is obvious. The creation of a transport route connecting Israel, the Cyprus Republic, Crete and the Ionian Sea with the ports of Italy is in such a context important. Such an axis avoids any interference by Arab-Muslim elements and any interference by the Turkish side, a fact welcomed by Israel which has known an intense conflict with Turkey. Turkey’s ambiguous stance vis-à-vis Iran concerning the embargo is also a relevant factor”.¹⁶

II.2 Russia as a geopolitical actor and its importance for the new geopolitical and geostrategic balance in the Mediterranean

Climate change and ice melting in the Arctic Zone is influencing in a direct manner the geostrategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby affecting the position of Hellenism. Steven J. Main, a member of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, comments on the importance of the Arctic Zone for Russia and the global balance, as follows:¹⁷ “For a start, the Arctic itself contains territories, continental shelf claims and exclusive economic zones, belonging to eight states, in total.¹⁸ Other than Russia, the eight states

17. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…: Russia and the Arctic, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, London 2011, 7-11.
18. To quote the standard Soviet/Russian definition of the Arctic, the latter is described as “the northern polar region of the globe, including the outskirts of Eurasia and North America and nearly all of the Arctic Ocean (except the eastern
include the other member-states of the Arctic Five, (those states that have a direct border with the Arctic, or have land which border the Arctic) the USA, Norway, Canada and Denmark-Greenland. The remaining three states are Iceland, Finland and Sweden. Russia’s border with the Arctic is the longest, measuring just under 20,000 kms.\(^{19}\) By nature of the sheer physical size of Russia’s Arctic border, it behooves the Russians, to put it mildly, to be very interested and involved in Arctic affairs! After all, much of Russia’s Arctic region is thinly populated, thus leaving it open to illegal activities on a wide scale, as well as presenting the local and central authority with a potential national security threat.

As shown earlier, as far as the central Russian/Soviet governments were concerned, Russian claims on Arctic territory have been well advanced over the years but, even so, it was not until comparatively recently that an attempt was made to define exactly what was meant by the phrase, “Arctic Zone.” Thus, by decision of the State Commission on Arctic Affairs (USSR Council of Ministers), passed on 22nd April 1989, the Arctic Zone was defined. In terms of its actual physical size, it measured 3.1 million square kms, (or 18\% of the total land mass of the Russian Federation). The area of the continental shelf, also enclosed in Russia’s Arctic Zone, is an estimated additional 4 million square kms, (about 70\% of the total size of Russia’s continental shelf).\(^{20}\) In other words, this is an enormous physical mass of territory, containing, potentially, a huge amount of hydrocarbons and other raw materials. However, even the physical territory, as pointed out by a couple of Russian experts recently, may also still have an important bearing on Russia’s development: for the new Russia, today the Arctic sector has become the most important reserve of land, [“prostranstvenniy rezerv”]…Under conditions when the independent living space,[“zhiznennoye prostranstvo”] of our country continues to be reduced and become exhausted, in the future, [the Arctic] will assist and become the fundamental [raw material] reserve for the Russian economy”.\(^{21}\)

Main explains that despite the current perception of a multi-polar world and globalization, “actual, physical territory is still important and no single state would be prepared to cede control over such a huge expanse of sovereign territory”.\(^{22}\) With regard to the hydrocarbon and mineral deposits in the Russian Arctic Zone, Main observes that “the figures are very significant and simply underline why the area is of such great significance to Russia’s future economic and political development. According to one Russian expert, the zone contains:

- 80\% of Russian’s known reserves of industrial gas, 91\% of [country’s] natural gas;
- 90\% of recoverable resources of hydrocarbons of Russia’s entire continental shelf;
- an estimated 15-20 billion tones of hydrocarbons is to be found in the deep water region of the Arctic Ocean.\(^{23}\)

Other than the hydrocarbon reserves, the Arctic is also estimated to contain more than 90\% of Russia’s reserves of apatite coal; virtually all of the country’s nickel reserves; 60\% of its copper reserves; more than 95\% of its rare earth minerals; more than 98\% of its reserves of platinum, etc.\(^{24}\)

Shestopalov quotes a figure, based on the calculations of others, that the total monetary value of the Arctic’s

and southern areas of the Norwegian Sea) and all of its islands (except the coastal islands of Norway), as well as the adjoining sections of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans”, (Great Soviet Encyclopedia, M. 1970, vol. 2, 267).


22. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…. Russia and the Arctic, op.cit., 11.

23. M. Shestopalov, ibid, 16.

24. Ibid.
combined mineral wealth could lie within the region of $1.3-2 trillion. If the latter figure is anywhere near accurate, then it goes a long way to explain why Russia wants to hold onto as much of the Arctic as it possibly can – as well as explaining the interests of others in wishing to exploit the Arctic for their own interests.

Despite containing only 1% of the country’s total population, Russia’s Arctic zone accounts for 11% of the country’s GNP and 22% of the total volume of Russian exports25 The potential reserves of oil and gas in Russia’s continental zone, beyond its established 200-mile limit, could amount to 9-10 billion tones.26 Of course, what lies in Russia’s Arctic zone is of primary interest to Russia, but there is increasing interest in what lies in the Arctic from other states in the region, as well as the huge and expanding economies of China and India. Largely using data provided by the US Geological Survey, (USGS), the generally accepted wisdom is that the Arctic could contain as much as 90 billion barrels of oil (12 billion tones) – enough to last the US for a dozen years at its present rate of consumption – as well as 47.3 trillion cubic meters of gas.27 Although these numbers are big, representing, if accurate, a significant proportion of the calculated world total of oil and gas reserves, it should always be remembered that these figures are estimates, not proven facts. The geologists could have got it wrong and, in actual fact, the recoverable reserves - regardless of where they are located – could turn out to be considerably less. The other factor which should be borne in mind here is that for the reserves to become a significant “player” in the further development of the economies of Russia, China, USA, etc., they not only have to be physically recoverable, but also economically recoverable, at a cost which still makes them attractive to be extracted from a part of the world which is still pretty inhospitable to both man and machine. The cost factor alone, never mind the harshness of the physical environment for a lot of the year, could still militate against exploitation of the region’s potential reserves for some time to come”.28

According to Main the economic benefits of the Arctic Zone and its appeal to other states are explicit; this raises concerns among many Russian analysts concerning Russia’s future ability to maintain its influence and counteract the influence of other countries in the area. Main cites an article written before the signing of the recent Russo-Norwegian agreement on the so-called “grey zone” of the Barents Sea, that stated the following: “conflict already exists between Russia and Norway over the famous ‘grey zone’… although the strategic interests of these countries – opposing the expansion of third countries – should coincide, as it is more than likely that within a few years, [both] the USA and China will arrive in the Arctic, interested in lowering the price of oil. Under such circumstances, will Russia be able to oppose the geopolitical influence of these powers?”29 30

Main draws the conclusion that Russia and Norway, despite temporary tension, share common interests concerning the hydrocarbons of the Arctic Zone. Their aspirations clash with those of other states, as the US, which would like to control the deposits of the Arctic and reduce prices, so as to assist its economic growth. According to Main: this “This could also have been one of the factors in the “surprise” decision, announced last year, to settle the decades-long territorial dispute in the area – over the so-called “grey zone” in the Barents Sea – between Russia and Norway which, in turn, could be a more hopeful sign for the future”.31

This region of the Arctic Zone is also well-known for its rich bio-resources: “For example, although the Barents Sea has less potential significant oil deposits than other areas of the Arctic Ocean, it is recognized as being in the top

26. Ibid.
28. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…. Russia and the Arctic, op.cit., 8.
30. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…. Russia and the Arctic, op.cit, 8.
31. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…. Russia and the Arctic, op.cit., 65.
fifty of the world’s maritime zones for bio-resources: in terms of biological productivity, the Barents Sea is second only to the seas of the Far East and is in the top 50 of bio-resource zones of the World’s oceans”.32

Over the past decade, Russia’s fishing fleet, operating in the seas of the High North, has pulled in an annual catch, on average, of 500,000-600,000 tones, approximately 50% of Russia’s total annual catch.33 One other author pointed out that Russia has also begun the commercial fishing of salmon, cod, Kamchatka crab, in the area. In relation to that particular species, one of the most commercially valuable, the plan is to produce some 3 million specimens for the tables of the best restaurants. Again, an indication of the potential non-hydrocarbon related wealth of the region.34

Similarly, one Western study in examining the potential for future co-operation amongst the Arctic Five also made an interesting remark about the region’s food and non-food potential: living resources of the deep Arctic seabed […] have not been catalogued exhaustively. With deep areas lying generally beyond the limits of conventional fisheries operations and research, the varieties and quantities of food stocks have not been properly assessed […] Nonfood resources such as pharmaceuticals and DNA material might also be extracted from certain life forms that develop and flourish under the Arctic’s unique environmental conditions (low temperatures, alternating seasons of light and darkness, and diminished ocean atmosphere exchanges on account of permanent ice-cover.35

Whilst it is unlikely that serious conflict would erupt over the Arctic’s bio-resources, nonetheless the latter could become a source of additional tension between states, both local and non-local to the area. After all, as the stock of the world’s natural resources – in all areas – diminishes, what is left increases in importance? In a detailed article examining the future of the Arctic and its potential to become a source of tension between states, one author made a passing reference concerning the region’s bio-resources and, somewhat ominously, the region’s importance as a source of one commodity of greater use and higher value than the Arctic’s reserves of oil and gas, rare earth minerals, platinum, etc – simple, fresh, drinking water: in the opinion of many experts, international rivalry will be exacerbated over the Arctic not only because of energy resources, but also bio-resources, fresh water”.36 37

Main does not exclude the possibility that drinkable water shall constitute a point of tension between Russia and other countries, as he notes that “back in April 2000, when Putin was acting President, at a meeting in Murmansk, he did make a passing reference to the potential of the North as a supplier of fresh water: in the future, we may find a foreign consumer for our pure, fresh drinking water which exists in abundance in the North”.38 39

In this context Main further observes: “The most recent statements made by both halves of the duumvirate (Medvedev and Putin), currently running Russia, testify to the fact that Russia’s senior political leadership are as one in making the

Arctic one of Russia’s key policy issues over the next decade – and beyond. This increasing attention was demonstrated when, a mere six months after taking office as President, Medvedev presided over his first session as Chairman of the national Security Council. And the title of his first session as Chairman? “Defending Russia’s national interests in the Arctic”.40

7. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…: Russia and the Arctic, op.cit, 9.
9. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…: Russia and the Arctic, op.cit, 9-10.
Medvedev opened the session by emphasizing the overall importance of the Arctic to Russia’s future: Without exaggeration, this region has a strategic significance for our country and with its [Arctic] development is directly connected the solution of long-term issues associated with the development of the state, its competitiveness on the global market.

According to figures which we have to hand, about 20% of Russia’s GDP and 22% of Russia’s exports are produced in the region. We extract rare and precious metals in the Arctic region. Here are located the largest oil-gas provinces such as Western Siberia, Tiuman-Pechora and Eastern Siberia. According to experts, the Arctic’s continental shelf could contain about ¼ of all…the reserves of hydrocarbons in the world. The use of these energy reserves, these resources is a security guarantee, an energy security guarantee for Russia, as a whole.41

Thus, in a few short paragraphs, not only did Medvedev outline the current importance of the region, but also the long-term plans which the men in the Kremlin have in relation to the Arctic. In order to maintain what Medvedev dubbed the country’s global competitiveness, he emphasized the importance of the area’s NSR42 “able to link in one the European and Far Eastern maritime and water transport systems and able [also] to lower transport costs, significantly invigorating business links of Russian and foreign business partners”.

Although the NSR will be examined in much greater detail below, suffice it to say that Medvedev was simply reiterating the hopes and aspirations of many in Russia itself that the NSR, with the proper necessary levels of investment in infrastructure could provide an alternative, viable transport corridor between East and West, crying competitively for maritime freight trade competing alongside the Suez and Panama Canals.44 Medvedev went on to state that Russia’s “first and main task” in relation to the Arctic is to turn the latter into “the resource base of Russia for the 21st century.” For this to be realized, in his own words, the authorities must “secure the steadfast defense of Russia’s national interests in the region” involving “the legal delineation of the outer limit of [Russia’s] continental shelf”.45

In a bow to the sacrifices of previous generations of Russian and Soviet sailors, explorers, scientists and leading public figures, Medvedev remarked: I want to especially underline that this is our duty; this is simply a direct debt [we owe] to those who have gone before us. We must firmly, and for the long-term future [of our country], secure the national interests of Russia in the Arctic”.46 47

Main also examines the contemporary geostrategic planning of Russia concerning the Arctic by analyzing an official paper issued by Russia’s Security Council titled The fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation on the Arctic for the period to 2020 and beyond: “[…] the document was approved by Medvedev on 18th September 2008, it was not actually published until 30th March 2009.48 The document is composed of six main sections – “general statements”, “national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic”; “main aims and strategic priorities of the Russian state’s policy in the Arctic”; “basic tasks and steps to put into effect the Russian state’s policy on the Arctic” and, finally, the timetable “for implementing the Russian state’s policy on the Arctic.” In effect, it is nothing less than a formal declaration of Russia’s plans to develop its strategic interests in the Arctic over the next few years and, as such, goes a long way to explaining Russia’s current and future stance on Arctic
issues. A proper knowledge and understanding of the document could assist the other member-states of the Arctic Five, and elsewhere, for instance, to better understand Russian policy on the Arctic, thereby helping to reduce the potential both for misunderstanding and misinterpretation.

In the opening section of the document – “general statements” – is contained the definition of Russia’s Arctic zone, as defined by decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, (22/4/1989) and reinforcing an earlier decree of the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, (15/4/1926). Thus, officially, Russia’s Arctic zone is defined as: …fully, or partly, the territories of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk oblasts, Krasnoyarsk krai and the Nenetsk, Yamalo-Nenetsk and Chukotka autonomous districts.\(^{49}\)

The section also describes “the specific features” which influence Russia’s policy on the Arctic such as the extreme weather conditions, the permanent ice-cover, drifting ice, as well as the low population density, the remoteness from other large industrial centres, etc.\(^{50}\)

The next section, detailing Russia’s “national interests”, as opposed to “strategic priorities”, although comparatively brief, outlines the future, practical importance of the region to Russia’s long-term economic survival: the fundamental national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic are:

- a) utilizing the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as the strategic resource base for the Russian Federation, ensuring… the socio-economic development of the country;
- b) preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace and security;
- c) protecting the Arctic’s unique ecological systems;
- d) utilizing the Northern Sea Route as a seasonal, unified transport route.\(^{51}\)

National interests clearly outlined, the document proceeded to detail Russia’s “main aims and strategic priorities”. Here we mention the six first strategic priorities, as well as the tenth:

- a) in the sphere of socio-economic development – to broaden the resource base of Russian Federation’s Arctic capable, to a significant extent, of meeting Russia’s [future] demands for hydrocarbons, maritime biological resources and other strategic raw materials;
- b) in the sphere of military security, defence and protection of the Russian Federation’s state border… to maintain a favourable operating regime [“blagopriyatniy operativniy rezhim”] in the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone, including support for the necessary [minimum] combat potential of the general purpose group of forces… other types of troops, combat units and organs [based] in the region;
- c) in the sphere of ecological security – to maintain and preserve the ecology of the Arctic, eliminate the ecological consequences of economic activity due to conditions of growing economic activity and global climate change;
- d) in the sphere of information technology and communications – creating a unified information space of the Russian Federation in the Arctic zone, taking into account [local] environmental conditions;
- e) stimulate the participation of Russia’s state agencies and public organisations in the work of international fora, dedicated [to analysing] the Arctic, including inter-parliamentary interaction within the framework of the Russia-EU partnership;
- f) delimitation of the sea area in the Arctic Ocean and maintaining the mutually advantageous presence of Russia on the Spitsbergen archipelago;
- j) modernising and developing the infrastructure of the Arctic’s transport system and the fisheries complex in Russia’s Arctic zone.\(^{52,53}\)

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…: Russia and the Arctic, op.cit, 11-12.
53. Steven J. Main, If Spring Comes Tomorrow…: Russia and the Arctic, op.cit, 11-12
The aforementioned analytical description presents in a thorough manner the new geopolitical situation in the international system which consists of the following points:

1) if Russia controls the NSR concerning trade sea routes, the strategic role of Turkey as a core area of the Rimland containing Russia is diminished. The same applies for its importance in the South-Eastern Wing of NATO. Such a possibility changes the facts concerning its diplomatic influence in the South-Eastern Mediterranean and therefore in the Cyprus problem.

2) Sooner or later Russia shall control a great part of the energy deposits of the Arctic, thus being able to make an appealing offer to Western petrol companies, an offer that shall not be ignored.

3) Russian energy cooperation with China shall be more attractive from an economic point of view, further facilitating China’s impressive growth which stands to 8% and augmenting China’s ties with Moscow

4) Power projections by both Russia and China towards Central Asia, Eastern Asia and the Middle East shall increase and stabilize, with no serious resistance by the US and a divided EU.

Map 4: The North-Eastern Passage (North Sea Route in green, North-Western Passage in red)
Map 5: Polar regions and peoples of the Arctic
[Source: Le Monde Diplomatique]
II.3 Degradation of US-Russian relations due to the Crimea issue and Eastern Ukraine under the prism of the Eurasian Union

The conflict between the US and Russia concerning the cooperation of Ukraine with the EU, an initial stage of its future integration into the European institutional framework, is connected to two axioms based on the current geopolitical reality: i) after the disintegration of the USSR the periphery of Russia is being claimed by the Anglo-Saxon powers, i.e. the US; ii) control of Russian periphery is possible if the EU does not depend on Russia for its energy needs concerning natural gas.

If we take under consideration that i) EU needs in fuel shall rise by 36% during the period 2008-203554 and that ii) demand of natural gas by the European markets shall rise by 24% during the period 2005-202555 one can understand the objections posed by the US concerning European dependence on the rising hegemonic power of Russia (Map 6).

The Tables show that strategic energy cooperation between Iran and Russia concerning natural gas can cover 40% of international reserves (2008 estimation) and 24% of international gas production. Russian natural gas amounts to 40% of imports made by member-states of the EU, while dependence on this product ranges from 0% (Spain) to 60% (states of Central Europe) and even 100% (Baltic states). (See Map 3)

We should also note that, as it is shown in Tables 1 and 2, Russia possesses 6.3% of world oil reserves and 23.4% of world gas reserves.


Map 6: Gas pipelines, existing and proposed, connecting Russia with the EU

[Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Major_russian_gas_pipelines_to_europe.png]
Map 6a: Ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine
Table 1: World oil reserves, production and consumption (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World share (%)</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
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<td>59.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: World gas reserves, production and consumption (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World share (%)</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gas reserves</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gas production</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gas consumption</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Dependence of EU countries on Russian natural gas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Imported natural gas (Gm³)</th>
<th>Percentage of market controlled by Gazprom (imports of natural gas, %)</th>
<th>Dependence ration on Russian natural gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The aforementioned Tables make it clear that from a geostrategic point of view reduction of EU dependence on Russian natural gas is a major strategic priority for the US, defined, as we noted above, by the model formed by N.J. Spykman. Still, we should also take into account that in the context of international geopolitical antagonism, as these are developed in Spykman’s model, there are new patterns of power redistribution. The latter are connected to the Economic Pillar of power and especially to its energy geopolitical factors. As Raphaël Metais observes: “Whereas in the 1960s the ‘Seven Sisters’ controlled over 85% of the world’s oil and gas reserves, the trend has reversed, and today the ‘new Seven Sisters’, the main national oil companies hold the majority of the resources. In this context, concerns stem from the fact that an increasing number of energy companies controlled by governments tends to overlook the basic logic of market forces in favour of wider political and ideological ambitions. At the same time, the reluctance of some energy-producing countries’ governments to accept foreign direct investments may further complicate the task of securing energy supplies for energy-importing countries.

The geopolitical framework of energy security based on the above-mentioned elements can adequately be analyzed through the ‘Regions and Empire’ scenario developed by Aad Correljé and Coby van der Linde. The scenario foresees the future of energy security issues through a “division of the world into countries and regions, on the basis of ideology, religion and political arguments”. The main underpinnings of this vision are the absence of effective international markets combined with highly integrated energy companies operating on a national basis. Foreign policy developments also tend to give credit to such a scenario. The division of the UN Security Council over the war in Iraq in 2003 is a telling example of different states or groups of states having diverging interests in a conflict in which energy considerations were never absent.

Another case study that tends to confirm these approaches is the behavior of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, since his election in 2000. Putin has demonstrated “a growing ability and willingness to use energy as a political tool in order to pursue its political and geopolitical goals [...] and strengthen its international position”. This appears to be part of worldwide trends towards a re-nationalization and politicization of energy.

Another interesting case study that confirms the aforementioned model is the Islamist, anti-Semitic and anti-Western Erdogan administration in Turkey, as well as the international behavior of China, manifested in other economic matters.

56. These include Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips and Total (only six after mergers and acquisitions).
57. Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), CNPC (China), NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela), Petrobras (Brazil), and Petronas (Malaysia).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
II.4 Geopolitical Analysis of the Middle Eastern System in the Present Juncture\textsuperscript{66}

In our paper published in December 2012,\textsuperscript{67} we presented a systemic analysis of the Greater Middle East Geo-complex, in the light of the geopolitical factor of the

Islamist movement—both Shiite and Sunnite. We supported the view—validated after two years—that the geostrategic planning practiced by the Anglo-Saxon actors of the Super-system of this specific geo-complex aims at the containment strategy of the Russian and Chinese actors from the Mediterranean Sub-system, along with their ally states of Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and some of the UAE (e.g. Abu Dhabi). Furthermore we also presented the view that with the rise to power of the Sunnite

Islamist governments in the region, a “remote” threat is tried to be exerted against both of the aforementioned actors in order to increase the negotiating benefits of the dipole of the London-Washington Special Relationship, in view of the provoked redrawing of the borders of the former nation-state regime.\textsuperscript{68}

Moreover we had noted that the US appeared willing to create strong and permanent territorial strategic bases in the Middle East, in order to guarantee, both for Israel and the US, the strategic depth that is desirable for their security. We were making reference to the gradually developing strategic plan for the creation of an Independent Kurdistan\textsuperscript{69} that would be able to serve Western security interests, as well as the energy-related interests of the Anglo-Saxon, and European oil consortia, but also Washington’s power projection to the Russian Near Abroad\textsuperscript{70} and the Chinese Northwest region of Xinjiang,\textsuperscript{71} increasing the power gap once again, in favor of the US, at the centre of the Rimland.

The analysis of the System of the Middle East utilizing the methodology of Systemic Geopolitical Analysis aims to record the geopolitical redistribution of power in the geopolitical complex of the Greater Middle East, in order to provide an objective approach of the geopolitical position and of the geostrategic capabilities of the Helladic-Cypriot dipole in the context of this power distribution.

II.4.1 The geopolitical factor of Complex

The geopolitical factor of the present analysis is the Sunnite and Shiite Islamist movements as a power redistribution factor within the examined geo-complex that is analyzed in the Systems described below:

The redistribution of power in question is examined within the Geographical Complex/System of the Greater Middle East, the Maghreb and the sub-Saharan Africa according to the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement.


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{69} Our emphasis. [I.Th. Mazis, ‘L’effet Syrien et l’analyse géopolitique et géostratégique du Moyen Orient actuel’, ibid].

\textsuperscript{70} Two years after this prediction the Ukraine crisis erupted, thus confirming once more our analysis. [I.Th. Mazis, ‘L’effet Syrien et l’analyse géopolitique et géostratégique du Moyen Orient actuel’, ibid].

\textsuperscript{71} We have already noted patterns of verification of this prediction in Xinjiang.
II.4.2 Definition of systemic levels/grades

I. The System: Greater Middle East, Maghreb, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

II. The Sub-systems:

1) The first subsystem: the Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Turkey triangle, as the operator of the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement.

2) The second subsystem: Maghreb, Mali, Egypt.

3) The third subsystem: Iran-Syria-Lebanon-Israel-Palestinian territories.

III. The Acting Super-system: This consists of the US, the UK, Russia, France and China. The EU, as a whole, is clearly influenced by the London - Washington Special Relationship. The UN as a Supersystemic factor is functionally neutralized in the short-term, due to the existing policy diversions among the three Security Council members and the Russia-China Dipole.

II.4.3 Analysis of Sub-systems

1. Analysis of the first (operating) Sub-system (Qatar-Saudi Arabia and Turkey)
Qatar cooperates closely with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood of Mohamed Morsi, as well as with Iran and Turkey. It does so, by competing with the hegemonic tendencies of Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and by pursuing a powerful position among the Arab state factors in the Gulf and within the Arab-Muslim world, on the other. In fact, Qatar together with Iran, exploit their common South Pars-North Field deposit (see Map 7) in the Arab-Persian Gulf.72

The geopolitical factor used by Doha to pursue these goals is the Islamist movement as represented by the Society of the Muslim Brothers by: 1) cooperating with Tehran in Bahrain and Yemen, where the Shiite element is dominant at a population level, 2) cooperating with Turkey,73 with the aim to overthrow the Syrian Baathist regime (competing Saudi Arabia on the same Syrian territory), and 3) cooperating with former and active members of Al-Qaeda, operating even within the Turkish territory, close to the Syrian-Turkish borders, a territory that Qatar uses on an operational level in the battlefields and in subversive activities via guerilla wars or uprisings in the territory of the targeted states where Doha intervenes. In fact, Qatar intervenes in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt (in the case of the overthrow of Mubarak and currently in strengthening “Brother” Mohamed Morsi), Libya, Tunisia, Yemen (creating destabilizing conditions for the Wahhabi regime of Riyadh which are critical for the West) and the financing of the Turkish “mediation” in the Syrian question.

Qatar’s cooperation with (questionably) former members of Al-Qaeda (such as Abdelhakim Belhadj, who also “worked” in Libya against the Ghaddafi regime), that have now been transferred on Qatar’s expenses (as Belhadj himself) to Turkish territory close to the Syrian borders, in order to organize the anti-Assad insurgency within Syria. These activities are extremely dangerous. Nevertheless, they are also followed by similar, equable yet presumably competitive, activities of Saudi Arabia that is worried about Qatar’s power projection in the region, since Doha cooperates covertly with Tehran.

72. “The estimations for the Iranian part of the deposit reach the 500 trillion cubic feet (14 trillion cubic meters) of the in place natural gas and around 360 trillion cubic feet (10 trillion cubic feet) of recoverable natural gas, that represents 36% of the proven Iranian deposits of natural gas and 5, 6% of the proven global natural gas deposits” [«Iran: The Geology», APS Review Gas Market Trends, April 2, 2007]. The estimations regarding the deposits that belong to Qatar are 900 trillion cubic feet (25 trillion cubic meters) of recoverable gas that represents around 99% of the proven deposits of Qatar and 14% of the proven global deposits. [Qatar Petroleum Annual Report 2005, 25]. According to the Oil & Gas Journal, (January 1, 2011), Qatar has 25,4 billion barrels of proven reserves in oil and is the 16th larger exporter of crude oil globally (based on the 2009 data), while it is 11th in the list among the exporters of crude oil among the 12 members of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) [Qatar Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis - Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal 1 of 10 file:///Z:/NewCABs/V6/Qatar/Full.html]. The production of the North Field/Dome is estimated, based on the data of 2011, to approach the range of 23 billion cubic feet. [QatarGas, RasGas, Qatar Petroleum and Internet]”, in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Pars_/North_Dome_Gas-Condensate_field.

73. Members of the main Turkish opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, say Libyan and Saudi militants are freely entering Syria via Turkey’s border. They also said that Turkish military escorts and protects the militants on their way to join terrorist groups in Syria. Analysts believe the move is part of an anti-Syria plot hatched by the US, Qatar and Saudi Arabia to fuel the unrest in the country by increasing the number of militants fighting against the government. “There are terrorists going through Turkey to get into Syria. They are all criminals and prisoners; Qatar and Saudi Arabia took all prisoners out of jails and sent them to Turkey to go to Syria to join terrorists there. There are 3,000 al-Qaeda members at the border, they fight in Syria and cause tension in Turkey and they are trying to ignite fire of war,” said Adnan Turkkan, political analyst and editor-in-chief of Ulusal TV, http://goo.gl/tGnBSi.
The recent developments in Libya prove that the destructive interference of the Islamist movement is leading the country into a breakup. On March 6, 2012, Cyrenaica declared its autonomy, based on the opposition of its armed insurgents towards the Gaddafi regime, as well as of the tribe leaders that live in its territory. Sheikh Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, cousin of King Idris who was expelled in 1969 by the Gaddafi coup, was elected leader of the Cyrenaica region by a local transitional council, with responsibilities for the administration of the affairs of Cyrenaica and for the defense of the rights of its people. It is important to note that the National Transitional Council of Libya does not recognize this autonomy, while on the contrary the former is “recognized” by the autonomous administration of Cyrenaica.74

Map 8: Subdivisions of Libya

74. See: http://goo.gl/uy8p6w.
Map 8a: Oil deposits in Libya
[Source: Petroleum Economist]
Currently, there are numerous hardcore jihadist Islamist organizations that operate without control in Libya, under Qatar funding, e.g. the Groupe Islamique Combattant Libyen [Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (GICL/LIFG)], that was created in the early 1990s in Afghanistan. The official declaration of its foundation took place in 1995 and it constituted one of the root components of Al-Qaeda, along with the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Yemeni Al Gehad, the Pakistani Al Hadith, the Lebanese Patriotic Movement/LLP, the Jordanian Beitl al Emâm and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front/FIS.

Islamists with a significant terrorist past, such as Anas al Liby (who was responsible for the attacks of August, 1998 on the American embassies in Dar-es-Salaam of Tanzania and Nairobi), and Abu Faradj al Libi, member of the Al-Qaeda Military Council, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2005, are all members of this organization.75

Under these circumstances, nobody could prescribe a stable future for Libya, particularly since, under this developments and especially in the light of the uncontrolled armaments of of radical cells in Libya, an Islamist dominance is observed in all of the North Mali in collaboration with hardcore cells of Al-Qaeda that are now acting freely in Sub-Saharan Africa, putting into danger the stability of Algeria, and probably, in the near future, of Mauritania and Morocco. In addition, the situation in Tunisia is not particularly stable and many analysts cast doubt on the sincerity and the “modesty” of the Islamic Al Nahda party now in power in Tunis.

3. Analysis of the Third Sub-system (Iran-Syria-Lebanon-Israel-Palestinian Territories)

As it might have become clear from the analysis above, Syria constitutes the key part of this sub-system. The collapse of the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah and the Tehran-Damascus-Hamas axes constitutes a strategic relief for the West for resolving the Palestinian issue on diplomatic terms, without external explosive influences. Also, such a scenario would greatly facilitate the appeasing of the explosive atmosphere in the Middle East and would prevent a significant amount of speculative actions by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the neo-Ottoman Turkey.

Undoubtedly, we have to take into account the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, even under a slightly “Turkish-Kemalist” model. This development leads to second thoughts on the issue of Gaza, which was occupied by Israel in 1967. Since Hamas is currently a subsidiary organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, an upgrade of its relation with Cairo and a downgrade of Tehran’s influence in Gaza is to be expected. The nature of this relationship (Hamas-Cairo), which is not yet clear, will greatly influence the resolution of the Palestinian issue with regard to the two-(independent)-State solution: a Palestinian and an Israeli one. This plan seems to have now been placed on track, even if in an embryonic state yet, with resolution A/RES/67/19 of the UN General Assembly, in view of accepting the Palestinian entity with a non-member observer status.

It is obvious that the international community wanted to strengthen the moderate wing of the Palestinian Authority, that of President Mahmud Abbas, which was being led to isolation and de-legitimization by Hamas, especially after the international repercussion of the recent Israeli military reprisal operation “Pillar of Cloud” against Gaza (14/11-21/11/2012). My estimation is reinforced by the statement of Thomas Mayr-Harting, chief of the EU delegation at this specific Assembly.76

On the other hand, the “international community” certainly took also into account the fact that Hamas

was seriously weakened after the strikes it suffered, even against some of its leading military officials (Ahmed al-Jabari was assassinated on 14/11/12 during the “Pillar of Cloud” operation), and that on a logistic level, its leadership (Ismail Haniya and Khaled Meshaal) had shown its intention to align with Mahmoud Abbas on the case of the recognition of the Palestinian entity as an observer state by the UN General Assembly. A study of the justification of the positive votes in the relevant Report on the UN resolution convinces us that the decision was taken in the context of a dominant “two Peoples-two States” culture, living in peace with one another. It is, however, important to note that the consultations between Israel and Hamas for ceasefire and termination of the “Pillar of Cloud” Israeli operation took place with the mediation of Morsi’s Egypt and not with that of Ankara, despite the latter’s keen desire to intervene. As we have already mentioned, peace in the region will depend highly on the resolution of the Palestinian issue.

3.1. The Kurdish factor and the role of Abu Dhabi and Israel

The reaction of the Kurdish population in Syria remains a significant problem, since they do not wish the prevalence of the Muslim Brotherhood without a guarantee for their national, political and cultural freedoms. The Kurds constitute an ethnicity of 32 million people spread in four neighboring states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria). Among them, only the Iraqi Kurds enjoy the above-mentioned freedoms. Furthermore, they have no trust in the Syrian revolutionary Council, due to the influence that the Muslim Brotherhood, with the aid of Qatar, has over it. The Kurds are constantly making moves towards their self-determination, as I write these lines. The destabilizing forces are intense and systematic, also with the financial and logistic support of Abu Dhabi through an immense investment scheme in the Autonomous Kurdish Administration of N. Iraq.77

However, the relations of Abu Dhabi with the US, the UK and Israel are all well known. It is also well known, that Abu Dhabi, along with Saudi Arabia, are not positively disposed towards a possible hegemony of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which along with a possible prevalence in Egypt, Tunisia and Gaza Strip (through Hamas), would constitute the possible base for a Middle Eastern Caliphate, with Qatar as its logistic core and Morsi’s Egypt as its headquarters. Under the threat of such dynamics, the geopolitical factor of the Islamist movement assumes a dissolving role, tending towards fragmentation of 1) the Alawite, Ismailite and Shiite Twelvers populations (around 2.2 to 2.5 million, i.e. 10-11% of the total population), on the one hand, and their concentration in areas close to coastal Syria; 2) the Kurdish

77. See: i) Tamsin Carlisle, «Oil strike in Iraq holds promise for Abu Dhabi», June 5, 2011, [http://www.thenational.ae/featured-content/channel-page/business/energy/oil-strike-in-iraq-holds-promise-for-abu-dhabi]; ii) Isabel Coles, UPDATE 2- “Abu Dhabi’s TAQA in talks for Iraqi Kurdistan oil stake”, Mon, Nov 12 2012, http://goo.gl/17vvT4, iii) “For Kurdish, the strategy is clear. In part by getting its oil industry scaled up, it hopes “to carve out more autonomy,” says Joost Hiltermann, deputy Middle East director for the International Crisis Group. “That’s the minimum. Ideally they want to be independent. They make no bones about that.” (In an article in Foreign Affairs, Hiltermann argues that “the Kurds will remain stuck in Iraq, but more and more on their own terms.”) In line with that aim, the Kurds are reported to be in advanced talks with Abu Dhabi National Energy for a majority stake in a producing oil field called Atrush.” see: <http://goo.gl/DxTGxo>; and iv) «Abu Dhabi Buys Into Kurdish Power Plant» <http://www.iraqbusinessnews.com/2012/04/09/abu-dhabi-buys-into-kurdish-power-plant> (Sources: Reuters, Bloomberg, The National). “KRG controlled parts of Iraqi Kurdistan are estimated to contain around 45 billion barrels (7.2×10^9 m³) of oil, making it the sixth largest reserve in the world. Extraction of these reserves began in 2007. Iraq’s former Baath regime controls the resources of Kirkuk and some parts of Mosul, cities claimed by the KRG to be included in its territory. As of July 2007, the Kurdish government solicited foreign companies to invest in 40 new oil sites, with the hope of increasing regional oil production over the following 5 years by a factor of five, to about 1 million barrels per day (160,000 m³/d). Gas and associated gas reserves are in excess of 100 TCF.” <http://goo.gl/qRx1ta>.
population (around 2 to 3 million, i.e. 9 to 10% of the total population) and concentrations of Kurds towards the NE Syrian borders, adjacent to the Autonomous Kurdish Government; and 3) the Arab Sunnite population (around 60 to 70% of the total population, that is approximately 13.8 to 16 million), that will occupy the rest of the Syrian territory (See Map 9).
Map 9a: Distribution of Kurdish populations in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq
With regard to Israel and its relations with the Autonomous Kurdish Government (Herermi Kurdisani / Iraqi Kurdistan in the Kurdish language), we must highlight the fact that, since 1965, these relations have long been established and are and could be characterized as good or even excellent. In particular, “since the 2003 Iraq war, relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurds have continued to grow, as both sides see that mutual cooperation to serve their best national interest. It is important to note that Israelis have generally demonstrated sympathy toward Iraqi Kurds, and historically there was hardly any enmity between the two sides. By and large, both Israel and the Kurds have at one point or another faced common hostility from Arab states. At present the Israeli army has stepped up its military activities in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Region. In August 2011 Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles were stationed in Iraqi to operate against Iran. Barzani gave Israel the green light to deploy them in northern Iraq without gaining the approval of the Iraqi central government

in Baghdad, which has no diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv. Israeli intelligence agents and military advisers, equipped with special transmission devices, were reported to be sent to Mosul to train Kurdish security forces.

President Barzani has reportedly agreed to the concession in return for the admission of a number of Iraqi Kurd students to Israeli universities. On March 25, The Sunday Times published the article called Israel Spies Scour Iran in Nuclear Hunt. As the story goes Israel is using a permanent base in Iraqi Kurdistan to launch cross border intelligence missions in an attempt to find “smoking gun” evidence that Iran is building a nuclear warhead. According to Western intelligence sources, the Israelis have been conducting such operations for several years. These risky intelligence missions have been intensified to an unprecedented degree in the past few months”.78 The French press has also published related articles.7980

Such a redistribution of power will ignite the chain reaction of the Kurdish irredentism within Turkish territory as well. From that point on, Turkey will be obliged to cooperate closely, once again, with Iran, in order for them to jointly contain the Kurdish liberation dynamics, and to re-isolate itself from the West.81

However, if Iran proceeds to relevant provisions to the Kurdish element of its territories, giving prominence to its racial kinship with the Kurdish element since the Kurds form part of the Iranian ethnicity, it will manage to sustain no losses from this situation, leaving Turkey alone to counter the Kurdish separatist move, taking revenge at the same time for Ankara’s stance towards Syria up until now. Furthermore, we already observe and predict a strengthening in the relations of Baghdad and Tehran on a religious base (Shiite populations), to the disappointment of the Kurds living in N. Iraq and Syria. This fact strengthens the explosiveness of the Kurdish ethnic element in the region. Tehran aims to substitute strategically Syria with Iraq, in case the regime of Damascus falls.

Conclusively, the results of such a successful chain reaction that will lead to a number of cessations and ethogeneses will allow Washington to regain most part of its lost influence in the whole region of the Middle East and the Russian Near Abroad, especially now that the US is going to be confronting a constantly growing financial problem that is extremely difficult to address. 82

Furthermore, it will offer Israel a safe territorial strategic depth, currently provided only by the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, with the Aegean and the Ionian Seas. We should not overlook the fact that, in the future, the Kurds could control the territories of the springs, half of the course of the Tiger and the Euphrates, as well as the oil reserves of Mosul and Kirkuk. In any case, the new emerging basis for the power balance that is being formed also favors Washington, London and Jerusalem.83

4. Analysis of Russian-American antagonism in the Eastern Mediterranean

Russia does not seem predisposed to allow the eradication of the Assad regime in the emerging new political landscape of Syria. Moscow would agree to the removal of Assad only if it could draw significant benefits in exchange, i.e. the creation of a Russian protectorate in the coastal region of Syria, inhabited by a significant number of Alewis, Ishmaelis and Christians.

The current regime prevalent in Syria offers secular contacts in Syria for Israel, even if the Assad regime opposes Israeli foreign policy in the area. A secular regime in Syria acting as counterbalance to the Islamist forces controlling a great part of Syria constitutes a rather positive perspective for the security of the greater region.

4.1 Cyprus Republic and Kurdish state-building

The disruption of Syrian-Turkish relations and the obvious attempt of the MIT to depose Assad, means that Cyprus should keep the existing balance and maintain its good relations with the secular side of the Syrian political spectrum. Syrian territory is being turned into a field of confrontation between the Turkish and the Iranian secret services, under the hegemonic presence of Russia. Moscow does not wish a strategic rebalancing in the greater region and the growth of Islamist movements in its periphery. Therefore, the Cyprus Republic should adopt a careful policy vis-à-vis the strategic interests of the Russian side, given the fact that Russia increases its power projection in the South-Eastern Mediterranean.

Russian anxiety is combined with the intensifying fear expressed by the Syrian Kurdish populations concerning a possible victory of the Islamists in New Syria. Such a fear is shared by Russia, China, the US and Israel. We should note (See Map 9a) that these populations (approximately 2.5 million) are located in regions adjacent to the Autonomous Kurdish Administration of Iraqi Kurdistan, a de facto state entity under US protection, which includes a parliament of 111 members, a flag, a national army, police forces, a national judicial system. It is interesting to speculate on the possible reaction of Iraqi Kurdistan in the case of a migrant wave from the Syrian side. The latter could be the result of an Islamist victory in Syria, i.e. of a Muslim Brotherhood government or an ISIS control over large areas of Syria and Iraq, adjacent to the Kurdish-inhabited areas. This possible reaction could consist of:

- The integration of the Syrian Kurdish-inhabited enclaves in the territory of North Iraq.
- An open border policy towards the Syrian Kurdish enclaves.
- A long-term union of the Kurdish areas into a single state entity. Such an outcome could occur under the auspices of the US. In that case the Islamist government of Ankara could not pose any serious objections, as it could not present itself as a guaranteeing force for the rights of the Kurdish populations.

According to Christof Lehmann, founder of nsnbc:84 “The green light for the use of ISIS brigades to carve up Iraq, widen the Syria conflict into a greater Middle East war and to throw Iran off-balance was given behind

84. goo.gl/tk5wkn.
closed doors at the Atlantic Council meeting in Turkey, in November 2013, told a source close to Saudi – Lebanese billionaire Saad Hariri, adding that the U.S. Embassy in Ankara is the operation’s headquarter.

A “trusted source” close to the Saudi – Lebanese multi-billionaire and former Lebanese P.M. Saad Hariri told on condition of anonymity, that the final green light for the war on Iraq with ISIS or ISIL brigades was given behind closed doors, at the sidelines of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Summit in Instabul, Turkey, on November 22-23 2013. The Atlantic Council is one of the most influential U.S. think tanks with regard to U.S. and NATO foreign policy and geopolitics. Atlantic Council President Frederick Kempe stressed the importance of the Energy Summit and the situation in the Middle East before the summit in November, saying: “We view the current period as a turning point, just like 1918 and 1945. Turkey is in every way a central country, as a creator of regional stability. However much the USA and Turkey can work in unison that is how effective they will be.

A. 85The summit was attended, among others, by Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernst Monitz, Atlantic Council President Frederick Kempe, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. It is noteworthy that Scowcroft has long-standing ties to Henry Kissinger and to the Minister of Natural Resources of the Kurdish Administrated Region of Northern Iraq.86

B. “Had Baghdad been more cooperative about the Syrian oil fields at Deir-Ez-Zor in early 2013 and about au-
tonomy for the North [Iraq’s northern, predominantly Kurdish region] they would possibly not have turned against al-Maliki; Or he would have been given more time”,87 said the Hariri insider during the almost two-hour-long conversation.”

The previous points A and B make it clear that the Obama administration had adopted since November 2013 a plan for border redrawing in the Middle East, a plan proposed by the North Atlantic Council. The Obama administration had also i) decided to grant autonomy to the territory of the Kurdish administration in North Iraq, compensating Turkey with the transport of Kirkuk and Mosul oil through its territory, ii) such an outcome could not be accepted by Maliki, so American and Turkish pressure ensued, iii) the Obama administration was not content with the anti-insurgency actions of Maliki, which favored Iran and Assad, thereby increasing its pressure on him. Points C and D, presented by Dr. Christof Lehmann, confirm this conclusion: “

C. In March 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry demanded that Iraq “stops the arms flow to Syria”88, while U.S. weapons were flowing to ISIS via Saudi Arabia into Iraq and Jordan. On Monday, April 22 2013, 27 of the 28 EU foreign ministers agreed to lift the ban on the import of Syrian oil from the opposition-held territories to allow the ‘opposition’ to finance part of its campaign.

D. “ISIS that was supposed to control [the region around] Deir Ez-Zor. [Turkish Energy Minister Taner] Yildiz and [Kurdish] Energy Minister Ashti\ Hawrami were to make sure the oil could flow via the Kirkuk – Ceyhan [pipeline];… Ankara put al-Maliki under a lot of pressure about the Kurdish autonomy and oil, too much pressure, too early, if you’d ask me”, the source said.89 He added that the pressure backfired.

Previous reports confirmed that Baghdad started intercepting weapons and insurgents along the Saudi-Iraqi border, cutting off important supply lines for ISIS brigades around Deir Ez-Zor, and that Al-Maliki began complaining about a Saudi – Qatari-backed attempt to subvert the Iraqi State since late 2012.90 Noting my remark he replied: “That is right, but the heavy increase in attacks came in May – June 2013, after al-Maliki ordered the military to al-Anbar”.91 (See Maps 10 and 11)

85. Points A, B, C and D were formed by I.Th. Mazis.
86. Our emphasis.
87. Our emphasis.
88. Professor Mazis had predicted this outcome since early 2012. Our emphasis.
89. Our emphasis.
90. Our emphasis.
91. A region in the borders of Syria and Iraq.
A previous article in nsnbc explains how Baghdad’s blockade caused problems in Jordan, because many of the transports of weapons, fighters and munitions had to be rerouted via Jordan. The Hariri insider added that the oil fields should have been under ISIS control by August 2013, but that the plan failed for two reasons. The UK withdrew its support for the bombing of Syria. That in turn enabled the Syrian army to dislodge both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusral from Deir Ez-Zor in August.92 (See Map 11)

Map 10: Day ar Zawr province

92. Our emphasis.
Map 11: Smuggling routes of Saudi weaponry to Syrian insurgents
“The situation was a disaster because in June Hariri, Yidiz, Hawrami, Scowcroft, and everybody was ready to talk about how to share the oil between the U.S., Turkey and E.U.. The Summit in November should have dealt with a fait accompli”, the Hariri source stressed, adding that Washington put a gun to al-Maliki’s head when he was invited to the White House. Both the President of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani and Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki were invited to Washington in early November 2013.

“Certain circles in Washington put a hell of a lot of pressure on Obama to put a gun to al-Maliki’s head”, said the Hariri source, adding that “time was running out and Obama was hesitant”. Asked what he meant with “time was running out” and if he could specify who it was that pushed Obama, he said: “Barzani was losing his grip in the North (Kurdish Iraq); the election [in September] was a setback. All plans for distributing Iraqi oil via Turkey and for sidelining Baghdad were set between Kirkuk and Ankara in early November...”93 “Who exactly pressured Obama? I don’t know who delivered the message to Obama. I suspect Kerry had a word. It’s more important from where the message came, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Nuland and the Keagan clan, Stavridis, Petreaus, Riccardione, and the neo-con crowd at the [Atlantic] Council94 … As far as I know ´someone´ told Obama that he’d better pressure al-Maliki to go along with Kurdish autonomy by November or else. Who exactly ´advised´ Obama is not as important as the fact that those people let him know that they would go ahead, with, or without him”.95

Asked whether he knew details, how the final green light for the ISIS campaign was given, he said: “Behind closed doors, in the presence of both Scowcroft, Hariri, and a couple of other people”. To my question “if he could be more specific” he replied “I could; I want to stay alive you know; Riccardione was tasked with the operation that day”.

Noting that a prominent member of Saudi Arabia’s royal family, Prince Abdul Rahman al-Faisal, has been named as the one being “in command” of the ISIS brigades, and if he could either confirm or deny, he nodded, adding that “the Prince” is responsible for financing the operation and for part of the command structure, but that the operations headquarter is the U.S. Embassy in Ankara Turkey. “As far as I know, nothing moves without Ambassador Ricciardone”, he added”.96

These facts show that Ankara is deeply connected to the upheaval in the Middle East. The US cannot sacrifice its faithful Kurdish ally which is i) the only factor of stabilization and power projection for US military and economic power in the Middle East besides Israel, ii) a source of hydrocarbons for Europe, that undermines European dependence on Russian deposits and iii) a steadfast land strategic depth for Israel. The US does not seem to repeat its mistakes in this region; rather it has been oriented to border redrawing in expense of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

In the context of this new American approach of dynamic balances in the region the US creates short-term tactical alliances which can be later rejected in favor of long-term strategic alliances. Such an example is the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, a fact that points to an understanding between Washington and the Shiites of south Iraq. US forces were not attacked and the Arab-Shiite elements of south Iraq increased their influence. Ayatollah Sistani, an Iranian national in control of the Mahdi Army (Jaish al Mahdi), a Shiite militia, was active in this region. As 62% of the Iraqi population is composed of Shiites, one realizes the tremendous influence of Iran in the new Iraq, with the exception of Kurdish territories.

The proto-state in Kurdish-inhabited North Iraq could prove to be a buffer zone between Iran and the Arab Shiite population of Iraq, if the US shows realism. This Kurdish proto-state shall have a key role
in securing stability and the strategic interests of Washington, without lying under Iranian influence. Solidification of the Kurdish entity on apolitical and military level shall cause the containment of Turkish aspirations for power projection in Iraq. Israel also opposes Turkish power projection in the area. Ankara, therefore, continues to be trapped in a strategic dilemma with its repeated diplomatic maneuvers vis-à-vis Syria and Iran.

In conclusion, dynamics of US strategic power projection in the SE Mediterranean is primarily located in the axis Israel-Cyprus-Crete-Malta-Gibraltar (See Maps 12 and 12a).

Map 12: The strategic zone of Anglo-Saxon interests connecting Gibraltar-Crete-Cyprus
[Source: I. Th. Mazis, Geopolitical Approach for a Greece’s new defense doctrine, Papazisis, Athens, 2006, 193]
Referring especially to the military presence of the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean, Cyprus is an important strategic-military point on the axis indicated in Maps 12 and 12a. British strategic planning in the two extreme points of this axis, in Gibraltar and Cyprus is presented in the following memorandum concerning British strategy in the Mediterranean: “In the Mediterranean the UK maintains a permanent presence on Cyprus97 and Gibraltar and there are two Infantry Battalions based on the former. RAF Akrotiri98 would provide an operating base for up to three swing-role fighter squadrons, ISTAR, AWACS and aerial tankers.

British forces do not have adequate access to bases for the deployment of anything more than a Brigade, their helicopters and transport aircraft in addition to an Expeditionary Air Wing. As a result we would have to rely on allies to provide air bases where troops can be deployed and supported. The Royal Marines could deploy with a full naval task force. In this planning scenario one of the QE carriers would operate three F-35B Squadrons – one would be a Naval Air Squadron for fleet air defence/anti-shipping and two would be RAF Squadrons primarily for CAS99/SEAD100 and land strike. The second QE carrier would operate one Naval Air Squadron of F-35Bs for fleet air defence/anti-shipping but would primarily operate Merlin naval medium lift helicopters and Chinook heavy lift helicopters. This carrier would support the Royal Navy’s full amphibious forces. Long distance support for the naval task force would also be provided by Maritime Patrol Aircraft with the assistance of A330 Voyager aerial tankers. Altogether the UK would be contributing over 90 swing-role fighters to support the 900+ combat aircraft available to southern European NATO air forces. Together with France, Italy and Spain, European NATO countries would be able to deploy a total of five aircraft carriers and four amphibious groups. (See Map 12a)

Map 12a: British Mediterranean Operations – the white areas could be covered by Typhoons operating from Gibraltar, Sicily or Cyprus101 and the blue could be covered by carrier based F-35Bs.

97. Our emphasis.
98. Our emphasis.
100. Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses.
101. Our emphasis.
To provide minimum effective land and naval task forces requires:

- At least 1 Division strength unit made up from Special Forces, the Air Assault Brigade, Royal Marines Commandos and 1 Armoured Infantry Brigade plus the 2 Infantry Battalions based on Cyprus.  
- 2 Apache AH Regiments
- 1 Wildcat AH Regiment and 1 Wildcat Marines AH Squadron
- 1 C-17 Globemaster Squadron
- 3 A400MC Atlas Squadrons
- 2 A330MRTT Voyager Squadrons
- 3 Chinook HC Squadrons
- 2 Puma HC Squadrons
- 3 Merlin HC Squadrons
- 3 swing-role fighter Squadrons
- 1 E-3 Sentry AWACS Squadron
- 5 ISTAR Squadrons
- 1 Maritime Patrol Squadron
- 2 QE aircraft carriers
- 4 F-35B Squadrons – 2 fleet air defence/anti-shipping and 2 CAS/SEAD/land strike
- 2 amphibious transport docks
- 3 landing ships
- 9 destroyers/frigates
- 3 Merlin HM/AEW Squadrons and
- 2 Wildcat HMA Squadrons.

This would clearly be an international operation in partnership with other NATO members. Regular training with southern NATO forces would greatly aid the effectiveness, co-operation and inter-operability of all combat forces. In particular joint operations with local air forces, French, Italian and Spanish aircraft carriers and amphibious groups should be a high priority. In this region Italy, Turkey and Spain are currently modernising their air forces with F-35 and Typhoon fighters. Unfortunately Greece has not been able to do this and still operates 70 older F-4s and A-7s. We should work with the German government to find a way of providing the Greek Air Force with the necessary finance to replace these aircraft with Eurofighter Typhoons which would strengthen NATO’s southern defences.  

Recent events have demonstrated the validity of this approach. US and British bombing of ISIS are carried out using the Akrotiri base in Cyprus.

102. Our emphasis.
103. Our emphasis.
104. Our emphasis.
Map 13: Combination of axes of Anglo-Saxon influence concerning hydrocarbon transport towards the EU

[Source: I.Th. Mazis]
4.2 Geopolitical Analysis of Turkish planning against the Cyprus Republic in the context of the Syrian crisis

I have supported the strengthening of the strategic cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel for decades, long before such a notion became of vogue in the last years. This cooperation between the three states should be reinforced in matters of energy and defense, so as to secure stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. This thesis is based on participation of Greece in the EU and NATO, of Cyprus in the EU, on the energy perspectives for Cyprus and the diplomatic support by Israel. These facts offer a guarantee of safety and reliability in an unstable region tormented by the Arab Spring, which turned into an Islamic Autumn and an Islamist Winter.

This Islamist Winter could facilitate a solution to the Cyprus issue, as one can discern in the statements made by the Turk analyst Erol Kaymak in the English-written Cyprus newspaper Cyprus Mail. Kaymak claims that the Turk-Cypriot leaders “who are worried for the collapse of the bi-communal talks support the recognition of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus by the Arab states in exchange for Turkish support on the Palestinian issue”.106

Arab states are members of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation which has already accepted the occupied territories of Cyprus under the name Turkish Cypriot State. Such recognition was also supported by the Palestinian side which also has been recognized by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as a state under the name Palestinian State.107 Turkey’s attempts to take advantage of Palestinian aspirations for state-building were also present in the crisis with Israel over the Mavi Marmara issue, as we had noted already in May 2011. Palmer Report issued one year later confirmed our views expressed in 2011. Palmer Report caused fury in Ankara, a fact repeated every time Israel proved the inadequacy of Turkish claims.108 Palmer Report renders a severe blow to the aspirations of Islamist Turkey to appear as a defender of international legitimacy in the Middle East and in the rich with gas deposits waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey aspires to extract economic benefits in the Eastern Mediterranean and to gain the approval of the Arab-Islamic countries.

Neo-caliphate Ankara realizes that if the axis of hydrocarbon transports109 connecting Israel, Cyprus, Crete and the Ionian Sea to Europe (East-Med Pipeline, See Map 14)110 becomes fully operational, it shall face serious problems:111

- Turkey shall not be able to blackmail Western economy and politics through the pipeline ITGI and Nabucco pipeline.

106. http://goo.gl/rST1oa
108. Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, July 2011, [Strictly Confidential ], (Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Chair: President Alvaro Uribe, Vice-Chair: Mr. Joseph Ciechanover Itzhar , Mr. Süleyman Özdem Sanberk).
109. “The project “Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline” promoted by DEPA, in collaboration with the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism of Cyprus and has been identified as a common interest project by the European Commission. According to the original design, the pipeline will have a capacity of 8 billion cubic meters per year and will consist of the following parts: a) A 150km underwater section from the deposits to Vasiliko, Cyprus b) A 650km underwater section from Vassiliko to the shore of eastern Crete c) A 400km underwater section from Crete to the South-East coast of Peloponnese d) A 260km land section running across Peloponnese e) An underwater section crossing the Gulf of Patras and finally f) A 220km land section from the shore of Aetolia-Acarnania to Thesprotia” [http://goo.gl/DT9Me7].
110. As noted by I.Th. Mazis in Geopolitical Approach for a New National Defense Doctrine, Papazissi, Athens 2006, 47 [in Greek].
111. See Map 13, compiled by Mazis in 2006, and Map 14 presenting the East-Med proposal by the Pubic Enterprise of Natural Gas indicating the route connecting Israel to Cyprus, Crete and the Ionian Sea.
- Turkey shall face problems in a potential cooperation with Russia regarding transport of natural gas from Samsun to Cilicia, in order to affect Lebanon, Syria and Israel.

The axis Israel-Cyprus-Crete-Ionian Sea-EU has a carrying capacity of 8 billion m$^3$ of natural gas towards Europe (2014 data), while it is estimated that this sum shall rise by eight times. As a consequence the West could become independent from Arab-Muslim and Russian hydrocarbons, thereby rendering useless the routes through Turkish territory. Control of transport routes by Turkey is contradictory to US and Israeli interests, making them susceptible to Turkish blackmail. Proposals that favor routes through Turkish territory are harmful for the strategic interests of the Helladic-Cypriot dipole. Such proposals are not based on proper understanding of the international context and serve only the Turkish side.

Ankara’s approach consists of increasing its acceptance among the Islamic world, so as to claim economic benefits in the oil and gas deposits of New Libya and on the matter of EEZ delineation with Egypt against Greece and Cyprus concerning Kastellorizo. The new Egypt under general al-Sisi has cancelled the Turkish aspirations.

Turkey does not recognize the right of a continental shelf to the island of Kastellorizo; therefore Turkey grants drilling ‘rights’ to TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) [See Maps 21 and 22]. Turkey is also aware of the existing methane hydrate deposits in the Anaximander, Anaximenes and Anaxagoras undersea mountain ranges. Through the unlawful –according to international law provisions of 1982- deletion of the continental shelf and EEZ of the islands Kastellorizo, Strongyli and Ro, Turkish EEZ reaches the Egyptian EEZ in a width of 140 kms (See Map 15).
Map 14: East Med Pipeline

Map 15: Distribution of methane deposits in each EEZ (the Kastellorizo complex is not included)

[Source: I.Th. Mazis & G.A. Sgouros]
The first geopolitical observation that can be submitted concerning Map 15 is that the undersea mountain ranges Anaximander, Anaximenes and Anaxagoras, rich with methane hydrates deposits,\(^{112}\) lie under ‘Turkish jurisdiction’ according to the Turkish view. The Turkish stance, combined with declarations that Turkey shall not allow Israel to use the Turkish EEZ in order to transport its hydrocarbons,\(^{113}\) causes transport ‘suffocation’ for Israel and actually is a direct blackmail towards Israel. Israel’s relations with Egypt had deteriorated during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but now have been normalized once more.

The only geopolitical actor in the greater region that can relieve the energy suffocation of Israel is the Greece-Cyprus Dipole through the territorial union of their respective EEZs, a perspective that can be fulfilled with the support of Israel and the US. Such a perspective complies with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay 1982),\(^ {114}\) specifically with Articles 55 and 56. Law provisions concerning the continental shelf are complemented by the articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey ignores the international legal framework, in order to blackmail Israel, gain the trust and support of the Arab-Muslim and Persian-Muslim world, forward recognition of the pseudo-state in occupied northern Cyprus, advance Turkification of the free southern part of Cyprus and control

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113. Carried through a pipeline or in the form of LNG, which is more cost-efficient.
114. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLO) provides definitions regarding Territorial Waters, the Contiguous Zone and EEZ. The Convention signed in Montego bay of Jamaica in 1982 and effective since November 16, 1994, replaced four older international conventions. The Convention was accepted by 130 states, rejected by 4 states -including Turkey-, while 17 states abstained. The Convention has been ratified by 167 countries, including Greece (21 July 1995) and Cyprus (12 December 1998).
the greater part of the gas deposits of the Levantine Basin and the Herodotus Basin, i.e. of 5 Tm³ of natural gas. Thereafter, Greece shall be a weak opponent for Turkey. Still, Turkey disregards the interests of other actors, of the US, the Kurds, Iran, Syria and Israel.

II.4.4 Analysis of the Supra-system

a. Analysis of the Russian Power Pole of the Super-system

Russia has three very important reasons to not allow the deposing from power of the Assad regime and the Baath Party “without equivalent geostrategic returns”: 1. the deep waters port of Tartus, which Moscow has been using as a naval base for the Soviet Navy and the Fifth Soviet Navy Squadron, according to the 1971 Soviet-Syrian Agreement, that covered Moscow’s needs when its naval bases were withdrawn from Egypt in the late 1970s. Back then, Tartus became the 229th Support Naval Base of the Soviet Navy. During the mid-1980s, and up until 1991, Tartus was upgraded to the 720th Support Base of the Soviet Navy. Afterwards, Russia, successor of the USSR, erased 73% of Syria’s debt to Soviet Moscow (13,4 billion US dollars), and maintained, on the one hand, its rights in using the port of Tartus, preserving also its role as the main arms supplier of Assads’ Syria.115

Turkey’s violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention transformed the Dardanelles into a Turkish strait, one that since 1982 Ankara can open and close in its discretion, in times of war or peace. This means that, for Russia, the only strategic naval base in the Mediterranean is the port of Tartus. This became clear when lately (in the spring of 2012), the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetzov crossed the straits of Gibraltar and sailed into the port of Tartus with its submarine escort. Also, in July 2012, another group of Russian warships entered again the Tartus port.

It is very important to consider President Putin’s visit to Israel (July 1, 2012) under the light of the subsequent loan of €5 bn which Moscow issued to Cypriot banks a few days later. If Moscow does not gain important benefits from the “West/NATO side” for the loss of the naval base of Tartus, probably acquiring a naval base in Cyprus, it will not leave Assad and his government helpless in Damascus. 2. The second great interest of Putin’s Moscow in Syria is that of the Russian arms trade to Damascus. Both these strategic Russian interests will be dealt with a lethal blow if the Baath regime in Damascus is replaced by another one, and especially if it is a Muslim Brotherhood one. 3. The third issue that will arise for Moscow is the proximity of a Sunnite Islamist movement with the area of its Muslim cultural basis in the Near Abroad, i.e. the in central Asia. Moreover, such proximity would lead to a possible destabilization of Iran, due to the Kurdish explosion caused by the probability (or the fact) possibility of an Islamic Syrian government.116 Iran is not a threat to Russia - quite the contrary. However, its destabilization could cause an expansion of the Sunni Islamic movement in Central Asia.

b. Analysis of the Chinese Power Pole of the Super-system

Iran is China’s principal oil and gas supplier. It is also an important area for investment by Beijing in the energy sector. Lately, for example, Sinopec, the largest and most important Chinese petrochemical company, signed with Tehran (on December 9, 2011) a USD 2 bn. net worth contract, for the exploitation of the Iranian field of Yadavaran, on the SE of the country. This field could produce around 85.000 barrels of crude oil per day (b/d) during its first four-year exploitation period, and around 100.000 b/d during the following three years. According to the contract clauses, Beijing is

115. Synovitz, Ron, 23 June 2012, «Why is Access to Syria’s port at Tartus so important to Moscow», http://goo.gl/26qCqR.
obliged to purchase USD 100 bn - worth oil and LNG from Tehran, during the following 25 years.117

There are, however, reasons of geostrategic security, similar to those concerning Moscow, that oblige Beijing to support the Shiite cleric regime of Tehran against the Sunnite radical movement, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported by Qatar and Turkey with the tolerance of the US and the UK. These reasons are namely the separatist Muslim movement of the Uyghurs in the NW Chinese region of Xinjiang, bordering with Kazakhstan, where the construction of a pipeline is planned, terminating in Shanghai, to supply China with gas.

Turkey supports this movement in every possible manner, so that in case the region of Xinjiang decides to break away from China, the supply with natural gas from Russia and Kazakhstan to China would no more be possible, due to the territorial interference of an independent Xinjiang. Furthermore, we should not forget that the region of Xinjiang is very rich in minerals (122 minerals in total, of which 70 are non-metallic), and in water resources (yearly flow of 88.5 billion cubic meters of surface waters and 25.3 billion cubic meters of exploitable sub-surface water resources). Water resources originating from glaciers have been calculated to 2.581 billion cubic meters. Furthermore, the estimated anthracite deposits constitute more than 38% of the total country’s deposits, while the estimated oil and natural gas deposits are 30 billion tons that is more than 25% of the country’s total. A change of regime in Iran could radically change the balance of power in the wider region, placing significant pressure on China through the promotion of the Sunnite Islamist movement in the region of Xinjiang, which is rich in resources and strategically important for the energy connection between Russia and China. During the 2000 census, the Uyghur population amounted to 8,399,393.118

c. Analysis of the Pole of the “Special Relation” of the Super-system

The already analyzed activity of the first sub-system, has as its allies an economically weak Washington and the Obama administration in a pre-election period, thus not being in position to present itself as belligerent, while the whole of the “Special Relation” desires to contain the expansion of the Russian influence in the Mediterranean, and particularly the South-eastern Mediterranean, which abounds in vast deposits of natural gas, in the Levant and the Herodotus (SE of Crete) Basins, and are estimated to surpass 6 trillion cubic meters.

Therefore, it is an Anglo-Saxon containment policy that the US, Germany, and the UK used during the 1990s also in the Balkans, aiming once more to contain Russia’s descent to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, such policy decisions are erroneous and irreversible, particularly when Washington, attempting to affiliate with the radical Islamist elements of the region, and following the dogma that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, does not hesitate to assign to the American information services to arm these radical Islamic terrorist cells to overthrow, for example, Assad’s regime in Syria,119 without taking into account that afterwards, it will be unable to control the Islamist government that may come to power in Damascus, or the possible fragmentation of Syria into three separate entities.

119. As Barry Rubin mentions: “Of course, a large part of the problem with Obama’s policy is that he not only treated enemies as friends and did not pressure supposed friends that acted like enemies, he joined them. Thus, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are arming anti-American Islamist forces in Syria with US intelligence officers supervising the weapons’ supplying. The only restriction is that the guns don’t go to groups affiliated with al-Qaida. Otherwise, it doesn’t matter how extremist they are. In Libya, one of the groups – treated as “good guys” – supplied with guns by the United States during the civil war there went on to kill the US ambassador”, goo.gl/K9cNFF / (accessed January 2, 2013).
(Kurdish, Alawi-Shia and Sunnite). Unless, of course, this is well within Washington’s aims, and Ankara does not have the slightest idea!

Therefore, we ought to put forward the following, evident question: is that, that once again, this Anglo-Saxon policy, inspired by the late period of the theories of Nicolas J. Spykman – and through the ‘kind services’ of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey- is actually leading to the creation of a most powerful Golem that will unleash Armageddon in the Mediterranean and will lead to an explosive and violent re-drawing of borders in the Middle East and Maghreb? Unless, of course, this is the result that is actually intended! And that the concern is to contain the Russian and Chinese interests away from the Mediterranean, especially now that the global economic crisis does not allow to the “Special Relationship” the luxury to maintain in power “pro-Western” totalitarian regimes in the region.

II.4.5 Intra-Islamic and intra-Arabic divisions in the Middle East, especially in the Arab-Persian Gulf, intra-Islamic and secular-Islamic tension in Turkey and Kurdish state-building in Iraq and north Syria

It is clear by now that the geostrategic planning of the NATO powers aims at a general re-drawing of borders in the Greater Middle East that shall be manifested in two parts.

First Part: Redrawing of the Map of Middle East in order to undermine Russian influence

This plan has been rendered necessary, as the power of the Shiite axis Iran-Syria-south Lebanon (Hezbollah)-central and south Iraq (under the Shiite Maliqi) increases in power. Saudi Arabia perceives this as a major threat, since it could signal the loss of Saudi leadership over the Arab-Muslim world to Iranian influence. The US shares the Saudi fears for its own reasons, mainly control of oil deposits in Middle East that shall lie under supervision and control of the geopolitical complex Iran-Russia-Syria-China-Shiite Iraq and Shiite-controlled Lebanon. Iran needs to act in an aggressive manner, in order to keep the cohesion between its various ethnic and linguistic groups which are united by their Shiite beliefs preserving the rule of the Islamic clergy. International tension favors the Islamist Shiite regime in Iran. Bilateral talks between the US and Iran aim to stabilize Iraq by keeping in power Nuri al-Maliqi, the Shiite prime minister of Iraq who gained power after the dubious elections of April 2006. This creates preoccupations for Israel and Saudi Arabia. Both these countries welcomed the rise of general al-Sisi in Egypt with US tolerance.

Concerning Saudi Arabia use of proxy warfare is fundamental to its strategic view; Saudi Arabia uses ISIS as its proxy actor, active in Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Turkish concerns over the activity of Islamist Salafists –their former allies- should be viewed under this prism.

The Kurds of Syria and north Iraq are restless aiming to create proto-state entities in the region between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. These tendencies were reinforced in the previous years by the political initiatives undertaken by Erdoğan as Prime Minister who had supported self-determination views of the Kurdish population of South-East and Eastern Turkey, so as to gain their political support.

These tendencies by the Kurdish national element favor Israeli strategic planning. The creation of a Kurdish unified state offers Israel a necessary strategic depth, a constant preoccupation of Israel. In combination with the maritime strategic depth offered by Cyprus and Crete, Israel’s security in this volatile region shall increase.

The geopolitical landscape that shall be formed with the eulogies of the US shall include i) a free Kurdistan, offering the necessary strategic depth to Israel and acting as a US proxy for control of the Tiger and

120. A prediction that shall be probably verified [I. Th. Mazis, “L’effet Syrien”, 2013, ibid.].
121. It is important to note that the first version of this text was written in November 2011 and presented in December 2011. The underlined part verifies the prediction made regarding current volatile environment in Syria and Iraq.
122. These were self-determination efforts and did not favor Kurdish autonomy.
Euphrates rivers and the oil deposits in Mosul and Kirkuk, ii) a divided Syria, the Sunni part of which covering central and southern Syria and in the western part of Iraq shall act as a proxy of Saudi Arabia, iii) a Shiite protectorate of Iran and US in the southern Shiite-populated part of Iraq, thereby excluding the possibility of a dominating Iranian influence in Iraq, iv) a secular regime in Turkey that shall replace the current Islamist anti-Semitic government due to the loss of the Eastern provinces to the Kurdish state and which shall reinvigorate Turkish-Israeli ties and v) a Palestinian State offering guarantees of safety to Israel.

Second Part: US strategy aiming at containment of China

The next part of US strategic planning shall include containment of China. The Obama administration -active until December 2016- did not reject the ideas submitted in PNAC (Project for the New American Century) concerning the future of Pakistan. Sibel Edmonds elaborates on this matter as follows: “In order to halt this, the globalists need to block China’s access to the Arabian Sea by way of Gwadar. According to Brass Tacks, to do this, “there needs to be a ‘new Pakistan’ as indicated in Operation

Map 16: Kurdish self-governed ethnic enclaves on the Turkish-Syrian border

123. http://goo.gl/uNwbKL “Bin Laden Death Script & the Needed Trigger for Next Step-Pakistan”, Sibel Edmonds, May 19, 2011. See also: newamericancentury.org: “Established in the spring of 1997, the Project for the New American Century is a non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership. The Project is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project (501c3); the New Citizenship Project’s chairman is William Kristol and its president is Gary Smith.”

124. See Map 8.

125. See goo.gl/MB4LQZ. BFP (Boiling Fogs Post), founded by Sibel Edmonds, author of the Memoir Classified Woman: The Sibel Edmonds Story. She is the founder & director of National Security Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), and the recipient of the 2006 PEN Newman’s Own First Amendment Award Ms. Edmonds has a MA in Public Policy and International Commerce from George Mason University, a BA in Criminal Justice and Psychology from George Washington University, and AS degree in Biology from NVCC. She is a certified linguist for Turkish, Farsi, Dari and Azerbaijani languages. She has verified language skills of Turkish, Farsi, Dari and Azeri. See more at: http://goo.gl/pdVHvE.

126. Brass Tracks is a Pakistani TV political series, presented by Zaid Zaman Hamid, an analyst in security issues and
Enduring Turmoil.” Operation Enduring Turmoil is PNAC’s plan to disassemble Pakistan into three parts.127

According to a “game plan” drawn out by Lt. Col. Ralph Peters, in a 2006 article of the Armed Forces Journal, “Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier tribes would be reunited with their Afghan brethren [and] would also lose its Baluch territory to Free Baluchistan. The remaining ‘natural’ Pakistan would lie entirely east of the Indus, except for a westward spur near Karachi.”128 With this done, what was once the NWFP,129 a province of Pakistan, is now part of Afghanistan, and what was once Baluchistan, a province of Pakistan, is now its own state, Free Baluchistan [See Map 10]. This would force China to impossibly go through Afghanistan and Free Baluchistan in order to reach the Arabian Sea. Such an arrangement would cut China’s route to the Arabian Sea” [See Maps 17 and 17a].130

Map 17: Reconfiguration of the Wider Middle East, in order to exclude China from the hydrocarbon deposits of the Gulf
[Source: Ralph Peters/PNAC]

broadcasted by the Pakistani network News One [http://goo.gl/3lL03k].
127. See Map 8.
128. See Map 10.
129. North-West Frontier Province (1901-1955) was a region of British India and then of Pakistan [http://goo.gl/PK8vQi].
130. For more see http://goo.gl/vef6qd.
Map 17a: The ‘New Middle East’ map can be found in the book Never Quit the Fight by Ralph Peters, Colonel (ret.) of the US Army, published in 2006. It was also published in the article “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look”, in Armed Forces Journal with relevant commentary by Peters. It should be noted that Peters’ last assignment was to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; his articles were published in official publications approved by the US Pentagon.

These plans were not fulfilled, since China obtained control of Gwadar in February 2014 with a bilateral agreement; China aims to develop the port by investing 12.5 bn US$ and turn it into a transport hub for hydrocarbons. Iran has already proposed the construction of an oil refinery capable of producing 400,000 bpd.

The creation of an Iranian-Pakistani-Chinese axis would be a negative outcome for the US, while the EU does not seem willing to prevent this. It is possible that the US-Saudi alliance, as well as relations with Israel and Egypt, shall be further enhanced. Such a possibility does not favor Turkish interests. It is clear that the unstable international environment threatens to unbalance oil prices for deposits directed to European markets. General turmoil shall prove beneficial to Moscow; the Russian side advances its oil and gas exports in three directions: i) North Stream, ii) South Stream and iii) LNG sales internationally, including possibility of later sales by the interested customers to third parts.

In conclusion, it is possible that given the tendencies of strengthening of Russian influence (See Tables 1 and 2) due to ice melting in the Arctic Circle and the turmoil in the Greater Middle East, two major trends rise: i) Russia doubles its energy potential concerning natural gas deposits and increase its oil deposits potential by 50%. Russia shall be also able to increase its percentage of natural gas supply to Europe, given the unstable environment of the Greater Middle East, ii) Russia shall improve its transport capabilities towards the Pacific Ocean (a region of strategic reorientation for the US). The US shall have to improve its relative power position in the NATO and vis-à-vis the EU, in order to maintain its credibility.

Therefore, the US shall also have to improve its relationship with Greece and Cyprus, countries that are in control of significant natural gas deposits in their respective EEZs. Cooperation of Greece and Cyprus with Israel and the creation of an axis of hydrocarbons transport that excludes both Arab-Muslim countries and Russia is of great interest to the US. A careful comparative study of Maps 6 (Routes of Russian natural gas through Ukraine) and 7 (Routes of natural gas through Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Greece and Italy). The deposits of Israel and Cyprus shall be exploited by companies from the US, France, Italy, South Korea and Israel, i.e. US and its allies. This poses the question whether and to what degree is Erdogan’s Turkey an US ally? This shall be analyzed further in our study. Still, this general rebalancing of strategic interests does not seem to have been fully understood by Helladic and Cypriot political elites.

Map 18: North Stream

131. See Map 11.
132. See Map 12.
133. See Paragraph II.1.
III. Proposals of Tools-Geostrategic Planning

The study of this geopolitical complex and the identification of a dynamic model of power redistribution is necessary, as only such a model shall offer guiding principles for a coherent geostrategic planning concerning Greece and Cyprus.

1. By referring to a geostrategic planning concerning Greece and Cyprus, I imply that there is a necessity of coordinated foreign policy by Greece and Cyprus that shall protect national interests.

2. National interest is approached according to two criteria, the legitimate desire of Hellenism i) to live in peace and security in the context of the new geopolitical environment characterized by power redistribution and ii) to respond to power rebalancing of this system, so as to secure the peaceful status that protects national interest.

3. In this context we should take note of the following model of power redistribution in the Geo-complex of the Greater Middle East and to emphasize the legal dimension of Turkish international crimes committed against the Greeks of Cyprus. We should also not omit to analyze the dangers that emanate from the legal framework that shall be created in the Cyprus issue and are connected to the communiqué released on bi-communal talks with representatives of the occupied north part of Cyprus. These points shall be properly assessed concerning international law in Parts V2, V3 and V4.

A geopolitical analysis is based on a sober and distanced description and study of the emerging power balance and of the power redistribution dynamics. These dynamics are studied, described and predicted through the use of specific geopolitical factors. These geopolitical factors define the geographical limits of Geopolitical Sub-systems and the respective Super-systems; the Poles of Power (state or other) of the Super-systems influence to a great degree the geopolitical factors.
IV. The Case of Greece and Cyprus: the Cultural Pillar

Studied in the context of culture (language, religion, dominant ideology, social development) Greece and Cyprus belong to the same Sub-system of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkan region. The influence of this Sub-system spreads beyond its strict geographical limits, i.e. in the Balkan region, the Black Sea, in Minor Asia and the Greek-Orthodox communities of the Middle East.

These regions are human spaces that should be recorded and studied in a sober and detailed manner and be properly evaluated as a sphere of cultural, economic and diplomatic influence for Hellenism and as diplomatic strongholds of Helladic-Cypriot cultural, political, economic and in some cases defensive space. Lack of interest for these communities by the Helladic-Cypriot dipole sends a message of indifference that undermines the national interests of Hellenism,

Such a view does not succumb to ‘national millennialism’, but is an act of self-awareness, self-conservation and creation of diplomatic security ties for the Helladic-Cypriot dipole; especially as it is derived from objective data and not from an idealistic nationalist outlook. Greece and Cyprus combined amount to 12 million people, while in Turkey the population of the greater metropolitan region of Constantinople alone exceeds 15 million.

V. The International Law dimension of Cultural Pillar and the Helladic-Cypriot Hellenism

V.1 A general geopolitical evaluation concerning international law

Recording of committed crimes against the Helladic-Cypriot dipole and claiming of return to international legitimacy is in itself an efficient tool of foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to include these facts in the geostrategic planning that aims to provide an efficient guarantee of security for both Greece and Cyprus. Projection of such a persuasive image shall make it clear that Helladic-Cypriot Hellenism respects its existence as a national entity, as well as established state entities in the international environment of legal conventions and agreements, thereby securing its recognition and respect from other intrasystemic or super-systemic state actors.

Such matters of international legal order that are constantly violated from the Turkish side, i.e. from Turkey itself, as has been demonstrated in the case of Loizidou vs. Turkey, create an atmosphere of defeat and pessimism in the fields of national security, territorial integrity, the democratic function of a state, human rights and individual and social liberties. As a whole, these issues belong due to their legal dimension to the Cultural Geopolitical Pillar; in the case of Hellenism this Pillar is under constant attack and fundamental change. This erosion of the Cultural Pillar causes serious damage not only to democratic and humanistic principles, but also to Helladic-Cypriot Hellenism.

In this context we shall use as a relevant example the international crimes that have been accepted even during the ongoing phase of talks concerning the Cyprus issue:

i) the international crime of aggression
ii) the international crime of Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus
iii) the international crime of forceful deportation of populations
iv) the international crime of transfer by the Occupying Power of people of its own population into the territory it occupies and the deportation of parts of population of the occupied territory within or outside it
v) the international crime of willful killings
vi) the international crime of torture
vii) the international crime of rapes
viii) the international crime of destruction of religious and cultural monuments
V.2 Recording and identifying the committed crimes against the Cyprus Republic by Turkey

The Cyprus issue has deep historical roots and various internal and international dimensions. However, since the illegal Turkish invasion in July 1974 and the military occupation of some 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, it is, clearly, first and foremost an international problem of invasion and military occupation by foreign forces of territory of a UN and EU member state, in direct violation of the UN Charter and a plethora of UN Security Council Resolutions.

Main consequences of the Turkish invasion were the killing of more than 4,000 persons, the fact that until today around 1470 persons are reported missing, the forceful deportation of 200,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and their property, the illegal transfer of people from Turkey to the occupied territory, as well as the destruction of cultural heritage in the occupied section of Cyprus.

Specifically, as far as Cyprus issue is concerned, there have been committed many international crimes and other serious violations of international law.

1. The international crime of aggression.

The Turkish invasion and military occupation in Cyprus appertain to actus reus and mens rea of international crimes against peace, i.e. to the international crime of aggression. According to the definition provided in Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Turkish invasion and military occupation in Cyprus appertain to case a) of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the aforementioned Statute, wherein aggression can mean the “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.”

Committed actions are also consistent with the subjective elements of the crime of aggression, according to which the perpetrator should act intentionally and be aware of the extent, the importance and the consequences of his actions. It is evident that Turkey as the attacking part acted intentionally and was aware of the extent, the importance and the consequences of the actions of the invasion, which was carried out in two phases.

Although the aggression by a state has been condemned as the most serious of crimes against international peace and security already since the end of WWII, the relevant definition was achieved only in June 2010 during a convention of the International Criminal Court. A generally accepted legal definition of aggressive war did not actually exist, as the forbidding of the threat of use of force or use of force –introduced

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134. This part was written by Virginia Balafouta (Ph.D. in International Law), Senior Researcher of the Laboratory of Geocultural Analyses of Turkey and the Broader Middle East of the University of Athens, under the scientific supervision of Professor I.Th. Mazis.


137. Ibid.


139. Maria A. Pichou, The notion of aggression in international law, Sakkolas, Athens 2013 [in Greek].
with Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter\textsuperscript{140} had not been specifically identified. The first manifestation of such a view was expressed with the Briand-Kellogg Treaty of 1928.\textsuperscript{141} The most accepted definition was the one adopted by the General Conference of UN in its 3314 Resolution (XXXIX/1974), used also in the text of the Statute of the ICC. Invasion and occupation of territory of a state is mentioned therein.\textsuperscript{142}

Concerning the Turkish claims that the Zurich Treaty of 1959, by which the Cyprus Republic was established, gave Turkey the right to intervene in order to restore legal order which was shattered by the coups against President Makarios, we should note the following. The Zurich Treaty of 1959 stated that the guaranteeing powers were Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, ensuring territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic, allowing each part the right to intervene. Still, the supreme -in international level- legal text is the UN Charter, which in its Article 2 Paragraph 4 explicitly forbids use of force or threat of use of force, which is perceived as legitimate only in cases of legitimate defense (defined in Article 52 of the UN Charter) or in the case of collective punitive measures, defined in Chapter VII of the Charter, or in the case of regional arrangements or agencies under the authority of the UN Security Council, according to Article 53 of the Charter. None of the above cases is valid in the Cyprus issue. Even if one could accept the argument presented by the Turkish side concerning its right to intervene in order to restore legal order, the intervention should last until democratic order had been restored and should conclude with the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus.

2. The international crime of Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus.

The northern part of Cyprus continues to be occupied by Turkish military forces in apparent violation of international law, specifically of legal provisions regarding national sovereignty, territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity. (See Map 20)

We should emphasize that Turkey’s guilt concerning those crimes has been stressed by international legal bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The European Committee of Human Rights evaluating the accusations of Cyprus against Turkey came to the conclusion that “… the Turkish armed forces invaded the island of Cyprus acting exclusively under the directions of the Turkish government and under explicit rules defining the structure and the hierarchy of these armed forces, including the establishment of military tribunals. Therefore, these armed forces are controlled by Turkey and any other person or property in Cyprus lies under Turkish jurisdiction according Article 1 of the Convention,\textsuperscript{143} in the extent that these armed forces exert control over these persons or property. Therefore, responsibility of Turkey is established, as these armed forces with their actions or omissions influence the freedoms and rights of these persons according to the Convention”.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} E. Roukounas, Public International Law, Nomike Vivliotheke, Athens 2010, 504 [in Greek].
\textsuperscript{142} Our emphasis.
\textsuperscript{143} Article 1 of European Convention of Human Rights, http://goo.gl/6S0S44.
\textsuperscript{144} G.I. Mintsis, Interstate appeals in the context of the European Convention of Human Rights, Sakkoulas, Athens 2003, 310-11 [in Greek].
Map 20: Free and occupied Cyprus (international crime)

[Source: Le Monde Diplomatique]
The Committee also came to the conclusion that “since 1974 Cyprus cannot implement its sovereignty in the northern part of its territory due to the presence of Turkish armed forces; that the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot authorities in this region by Turkey as a ‘Turkish Federate State of Cyprus’ does not influence the continuing existence of the Cyprus Republic as a unified state and as a high contributing part to this Convention; and that therefore the ‘Turkish Federate State of Cyprus’ cannot be regarded as an entity exerting jurisdiction over any part of Cyprus in the sense of Article 1 of the Convention”.

In this way the European Committee of Human Rights recognized the status in north Cyprus as military occupation and rejected any ideas of recognition for the “TRNC”. The Committee also added in its Report to the Committee of Ministers in 1983 that “the existence of a sort of political administration in northern Cyprus does not exclude Turkish responsibility given the control exerted by Turkey in northern Cyprus. Specifically, the Committee is convinced that fundamental changes in the situation of northern Cyprus cannot be decided without the direct or silent approval of the Turkish authorities”.145 In its Report issued in 1999 the Committee draws the conclusion that “Turkey exerts detailed control over the politics and the actions of the Turkish Cypriot pseudo-state, regardless of the direct or indirect way of application of said control, i.e. through the army or through a subordinate local government”.146

Additionally the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Loizidou vs. Turkey (a decision to which Turkey finally complied) reported in 1996 that Turkey exerts effective or complete control over the armed forces stationed in the northern occupied part of Cyprus, accepted Turkey as a party to the proceedings and charged Turkey with the violations against Loizidou committed by the Turkish armed forces after the 1974 invasion. The Court decided that since Turkey exerts effective control over this territory all violations should be charged to Turkey and persons whose rights are harmed lie under Turkish jurisdiction.147

What is really important regarding this decision is the fact that violations are blamed on Turkey, i.e. on a specific state and a specific military and political leadership, and vaguely on the Turk-Cypriot side, i.e. on the non recognized entity of “TRNC”, which could not be put under pressure or charged in the context of international law.

We should also note that the European Court of Human Rights imposed on Turkey a fine of 90 million Euros for its implication in the 1974 invasion and the continuing occupation of the northern part of Cyprus.

3. The international crime of forceful deportation of populations.

Violent deportation of over 200.000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and their property appertain to international crimes against humanity. According to Article 7 (1) (d) and 7 (2) (d) of the Statute of ICC: “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law”.148

In order to be classified as crimes against humanity these specific actions should not be isolated facts, but part of governmental policy, or part of a widespread or systematic practice of perpetration of atrocities committed with the tolerance or the assistance of a government or a de facto authority.149 Such prerequisite applies to the Cyprus issue, since violent deportation of the Greek Cypriots was part of a wider strategic policy by Turkey, which was aiming at the de jure acceptance of the bisection of the island. The said approach was based on the following parameters:

145. G.I. Mintsis, ibid, 315.
149. Antonio Cassese, op.cit., 520.
- transport of Turkish Cypriots to the northern part, in order to create territorial continuity, providing the basis for a federal structure or even division of Cyprus.
- deportation of Greek Cypriots from the occupied territories, in order to create ethnic homogeneity.
- transfer Turkish population to the northern occupied part of Cyprus, thereby changing the existing demographic balance in favor of the smaller Turkish Cypriot population.
- creation of legal structures concerning the Turkish Cypriot population, thereby providing its actions with legitimacy.¹⁵⁰

The main axes of Turkish foreign policy are listed below (Section V.4.5), as these were formulated in 1956 by Nihat Erim (1912-1980) and totally adopted by all subsequent Turkish governments. These axes are connected to the international crimes committed in Cyprus from the Turkish side.

3.1 The international crime of ethnic cleansing.
We should note that during the second appeal by Cyprus vs. Turkey submitted in 1975 before the European Commission of Human Rights it was mentioned that Turkey had made unlawful distinctions against the Greek Cypriots due to their ethnic origins and their religion, thus fulfilling an organized plan to deport the Greek Cypriot population and settle the region exclusively with Turkish Cypriots and Turks from mainland Turkey, thereby adopting a policy of ethnic cleansing.¹⁵¹

Ethnic cleansing is the forced removal of civilian population who belong to a specific group from a certain territory.¹⁵²

As far as mens rea of the crime is concerned, it is required intention of the perpetrator and also dolus specialis, i.e. the perpetrator has to be aware of the context of the crime, meaning the systematic policy of wide and large scale abuses.¹⁵³

Therefore, the subjective elements of the crime are present in the certain case, because -as shown above- these actions were not isolated events, but formed part of a wider Turkish strategy.

Crimes against humanity can be committed even in times of peace, so that for the definition to apply it is not necessary that the defining actions have been committed during an armed conflict between two sides; thus, these acts against Greek Cypriots committed during the 1974 invasion belong to the category of crimes against humanity, regardless of the time framework.

3.2 The international crime of enforced disappearance of persons.
According to Article 7 (1) (i) and 7 (2) (i) of the Statute of ICC enforced disappearance of persons is a crime against humanity: “Enforced disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”¹⁵⁴

The issue of the missing persons in Cyprus, being perceived as part of a governmental policy or a wider or systematic context of atrocities committed with the tolerance or the assistance of a government or a de facto authority, is also a crime against humanity, as relevant actus reus and mens rea are fulfilled.

¹⁵². Antonio Cassese, op.cit., 524.
Furthermore, it has to be stressed that, until today, Turkey has not cooperated in any way concerning the issue of the missing Helladic and Greek Cypriot soldiers. In any way, these actions constitute of very serious violations of international humanitarian law.

We should also note that in its Report released in 1983 the European Commission of Human Rights claims that Turkey is evidently responsible for the fate of the missing persons, emphasizes the fact that Turkey has not provided any relevant information, mentions that these persons cannot be held as prisoners of war any longer in any meaningful sense and concludes that their death cannot be excluded as a possibility. The European Court of Human Rights accepted the validity of this Report.155

4. The international crime of transfer by the Occupying Power of people of its own population into the territory it occupies and the deportation of parts of population of the occupied territory within or outside it.

The ongoing transfer of people within or outside the occupied northern part of Cyprus constitutes a war crime, as the objective and the subjective elements of the crime -as established in the ICC Statute and the Geneva Conventions of 1949- are present in the current situation. More specifically, it appertains to the Article 8 (2) (b) (viii), which defines as war crime “the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory”.156

According to this Article and also case vii of Paragraph 2 of the same Article (Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement), it is clear that the violent deportation of Greek Cypriots157 committed during the invasion is also a war crime.158

Violent deportation of a part of population is forbidden according to the provisions of the IV Geneva Convention of 1949, which constitutes customary law. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention read as follows: “The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”.159 Paragraph 1 of the same article reads as follows: “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive”.160

Moreover, regarding the subjective elements of the crime intention of the perpetrator is necessary in each crime case.161 Even negligence on part of the implicated actor is sufficient for a war crime to be declared; in the Cyprus invasion there is also intention and organized planning of these criminal acts.

Turkey’s policy of colonization in Cyprus is contrary to the 1960 Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Annex D to the Treaty governs Cyprus’ citizenship and makes it impossible and unlawful for either Community to upset the demographic balance by bringing in large numbers of ethnic Turks or Greeks and contend that they were of Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot descent and therefore entitled to come to Cyprus.162

157. The violent deportation of Greek Cypriots constitutes a crime against humanity as well, as noted above.
Demographic change in Cyprus presents Hellenism with stark realities of demographic balance in Cyprus. The Institute of Demographic and Migration Policy of Cyprus released a report according to which “Greek Cypriots are already a minority on the island. According to the 2011 census the Greek Cypriot population amounts only to 572,000 with decreasing tendencies. The President of the Institute, Yannakis Matsis, claimed that a ‘population disaster’ is imminent, since the residents in the occupied part and the Islamic population exceeds the Greek Cypriot population. Low fertility among the Greek Cypriot population, population ageing and the immigration problem”. According to Penelope Christophoridou, an economic analyst and member of the Institute, “high fertility in the occupied part and migration influx created a number of about 500-800,000 Turks. A careful look at the statistical data available leads to the conclusion that in the whole of the Cyprus Republic the Greek Cypriot population (around 572,000) is a minority. Planning and implementation of a coherent demographic and migration policy is needed, in order to protect and secure our national identity and culture, as well as demographic balance in Cyprus”. Christophoridou also mentioned that such a policy should aim foremost at reducing emigration of Cypriot citizens, especially the young ones, a great number of whom given the financial crisis have emigrated to other countries, and at the same time limiting immigration in Cyprus from other countries. The Greek Cypriot population has a low fertility rate; the population is ageing fast, while there is a serious migration problem, consisting of both non-Cypriot immigration and Cypriot emigration. She concluded that “according to statistical data available by the Cyprus Republic the population of the free part of the island increase in the period 1974-1990 by 13.7%, while for the same period increase in the occupied part amounted to 48.35% due to massive influx of Turks in 1975 and 1977”.

5. The international crime of willful killings.
Willful killings are self-evidently war crimes, according to Article 8 (2) (a) (i) of the ICC Statute and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In its appeal against Turkey before the European Commission of Human Rights Cyprus estimated that those murdered by the Turkish armed forces amounted to 3,000 individuals at least. The Commission accepted as a fact the mass murder of 12 Greek Cypriot citizens by Turkish soldiers acting under the orders of a Turkish officer in the region of the village Elia; it also accepted that there were strong indications concerning the mass murder of 17 citizens in Palaikythro, while it concluded that the Turkish troops committed mass murders of Greek Cypriots on a large scale.

6. The international crime of torture.
Torture is a war crime according to Article 8 (2) (a) (ii) of the Statute of the ICC, while it is an international crime in its own. Definition of torture is provided in Article 1.1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by the United Nations in 1984. According this article “the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”. 170

If torture is perpetrated in time of armed conflict it is a war crime. In these cases the crime can be committed even by a person with no official capacity, but a form of “passive participation” by the state authorities is required.

Torture as a discrete crime may be perpetrated either in time of peace or in time of armed conflict, but that the pain of suffering must be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 171

In the case in question Cyprus has accused Turkey before the European Commission of Human Rights of systematic torture against prisoners and civilians, including children, women and elderly that were committed under the systematic guidance of Turkish authorities and officials. The Committee acknowledged that the Turkish army had committed systematic torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, as well deprivation of food and medical care concerning Greek Cypriot prisoners. 172 These crimes were attributed to the Turkish army, therefore implying ‘active’, not just ‘passive participation’ of the authorities.

The objective and the subjective elements of the war crime of torture is evident in this case; the perpetrators acted intentionally, in order to cause pain or grief, as it is analyzed above.

7. The international crime of rapes.

Rape is a war crime according to Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) of the Statute of the ICC and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 173 The European Commission of Human Rights concluded that “there was sufficient evidence for the perpetration of mass and repeated rapes of women by Turkish soldiers. These were not isolated facts, but committed on a large scale”. 174

We should note that willful killings, torture and rapes are also crimes against humanity – according to Article 7 (1) (a), (f), (g) of the Statute of ICC and therefore include all relevant actions committed in time of peace, if these actions are part of governmental policy, or part of a wider or systematic context of perpetration of atrocities committed under the tolerance or with the assistance of governmental authorities or a de facto authority. 175

8. The international crime of destruction of religious and cultural monuments.

Finally, destruction of religious and cultural monuments committed in Cyprus during the conflict constitute a war crime, according to Article 8 (2) (b) (ix) of the Statute of the ICC, which defines as a war crime “Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives”. 176

As noted above, even mere negligence is sufficient for a war crime to be regarded as such; in the case of the Cyprus issue there is also willful intention, as well as a greater planning of systematic destructions.

More specifically, the ongoing and systematic destruction of the Greek and Christian cultural heritage in the occupied area of Cyprus by Turkey is part of a pre-planned policy aimed at eradicating and destroying every trace

170. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx
174. G.I. Mintsis, op.cit, 331.
175. Antonio Cassese, International Law, op.cit., 520.
of a culture that dates back thousands of years, and at transforming occupied Cyprus into just another Turkish province, through a systematic process of Turkification.

Important archaeological sites in the occupied area of Cyprus have, since 1974, been completely abandoned and left open to the constant risk of looting and destruction. Illegal excavation is a frequent occurrence in Salamina, Kyrenia, Famagusta and the Karpasian Peninsula. Moreover, at times, the illegal authorities in occupied Cyprus also destroy archaeological sites. A typical example of such destruction was suffered by a Neolithic settlement in the vicinity of Castro, on the Agios Andreas promontory. The most violent and systematic attack has been suffered by Greek Orthodox churches, which are the most obvious and easily recognizable symbols of the area’s cultural identity.\(^{177}\)

The war crime of destruction of religious and cultural monuments is referred to destructions committed during an armed conflict; still, destruction of religious and cultural monuments is a condemnable action whenever and wherever they are recorded. It is worth mentioning that in the context of international law there is the crime of cultural genocide, i.e. of destruction of language or civilization of a group. A problematic aspect of the UN Convention of 1948 concerning genocide is indeed the fact that the notion of cultural genocide is not included therein.\(^{178}\)

V.3. Legal treatment of international crimes.\(^{179}\)

The Cyprus issue presents multiplicity of offences as far as the main perpetrators are concerned. Specifically - according to rules of national criminal law and international criminal law - it is “real concurrence of offences”, since there have been committed many different international crimes, through many different actions, against many persons.

It is worth mentioning that the perpetrators of an international crime can be persecuted and punished by any state, regardless of the existence of ties of territoriality or nationality regarding the perpetrator or the victim, if the perpetrator is located in the territory of the prosecuting state.\(^{180}\)

In the context of international jurisdiction, if an international crime is committed, the perpetrator can be prosecuted from a state without ties of territoriality or nationality regarding the perpetrator or the victim of the crime in question, even if the perpetrator is located in the territory of a third state which does not prosecute or extradite him. Therefore, it is evident that there is an extended legitimate interest concerning prosecution of international crimes based on the assumption that such repulsive acts should not remain unpunished, as they insult the global community and not only the relevant states and individuals implicated.

The notion of crimes against humanity, established after the end of WWII, included all those actions contrary to fundamental values deemed inherent in every human being. Therefore the term ‘humanity’ mentioned in the notion does not refer to ‘human species’, rather to the ‘identity or essence’ of a human being.\(^{181}\) According to Sir Hartley Shawcross, lead British prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal, in some cases there are limits to the ‘omnipotent state’ and that ‘the individual person, the basic unit of every legal system, does not lose the right of protection of humanity, when the state violates his rights in a way insulting the conscience of humanity.\(^{182}\) In that sense a person has an individual legitimate interest to seek justice for crimes against humanity, even if he was not a victim of these crimes.\(^{183}\)

179. Paragraph V.3 was authored by Virginia Balafouta.
182. Antonio Cassese, op.cit., 519.
183. Our emphasis.
From these points one can discern the gravity and the total condemnation of international crimes by the international community. We should emphasize that the *rules applying to international crimes are jus cogens*, i.e. rules of compulsory international law that cannot be broken and which create obligations erga omnes, obligations towards every direction.\(^\text{184}\) The power and applicability of the rules concerning international crimes is augmented, as these rules are binding for all states, regardless of the ratification or not of the relevant treaties—in this case the ICC Statute. A state cannot forward as a contradictory argument the non existence or the use of a different legal provision in its internal law. Punishing of these crimes, both in internal and international law, intensifies the negative dimension of international crimes. *International crimes, according to the dominant legal view, are not subject to prescription*, so as to ensure punishment of the perpetrators of these crimes.\(^\text{185}\) Therefore, there can be no limitation period for the crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Cyprus and their perpetrators can be persecuted at any time. The fact that international crimes are not subject to prescription emphasizes in its legal context the absolute condemnation of these crimes.

We should also note that granting of amnesty which eradicates the punishable dimension of an action, belongs to the will of each state, still it does not belong at all times exclusively to the internal jurisdiction of a state. Granting of amnesty is not accepted and is not binding for international courts or for internal courts of another state; its legitimacy can be reevaluated from the ICC if it is proved that such amnesty was granted to the lack of will from that state to prosecute a perpetrator or a group of perpetrators, so that these are not punished for the international crimes they perpetrated. The dominant legal view is that persons guilty of serious violations of human rights and international law are prosecuted and punished. According to the case law of the Special Court for Sierra Leone granting of amnesty by a state to its citizens that have committed international crimes cannot be taken into account in the case of crimes against humanity, genocide and other serious violations of humanitarian law.\(^\text{186}\)

Case law regarding granting of amnesty for international crimes highlights the importance of these crimes and the limitations imposed in the internal jurisdiction of the states in favor of a global treatment of these crimes.

Another matter of importance is that cannot be a retrospective application of penal laws. Specifically regarding international crimes, the International Military Court of Nuremberg emphasized that ‘the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege is not a principle that sets limits to state sovereignty but a principle of justice. The claim that it is not just to punish those who in contempt of international treaties and assurances attacked against neighboring states without official warning is obviously a wrong assumption; in such cases the attacker should know that he is committing a crime, so that it would be unjust to allow that crime to remain unpunished.’\(^\text{187}\)

Internal courts of the Law 10/1945, established after the end of WWII, claimed that customary law is not static; it should be rather flexible to be adjusted to new data created by natural progress. One could claim that this could mean the retrospective application of new rules of law and that by recognizing the existence of a new customary law one also recognizes the possibility of a retrospective functional application. In a similar context it is claimed that establishing of the punishable character of a violation of international law can be achieved through the process of producing customary law. But customary law constitutes a main source of international law.\(^\text{188}\) The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia claimed that the goal of the principle of non retrospective application is to avert punishment of a person concerning actions that this person perceived as legitimate when committed. It is therefore not possible to claim that the common man while committing actions fulfilling the objec-

\(^\text{186}\) K. Antonopoulos, op.cit., 353-68.
\(^\text{187}\) K. Antonopoulos, op.cit., 70.
\(^\text{188}\) K. Antonopoulos, op.cit., 81-82, 92.
tive and subjective elements of crimes against humanity did not realize the criminal character of these actions.\textsuperscript{189}

Punishment of international crimes strengthens the application of international law, especially of jus cogens, as well as application of decisions issued by international courts. In this way the common sense of justice is satisfied, increasing trust in international law; persons that through their actions have insulted the humanity as a whole do not remain unpunished. Legal treatment of the perpetrators of these crimes in the context of international criminal law points to the idea that criminal punishment of the perpetrators works in a preemptive manner for respective crimes in the future.

V.4. Specific issues concerning the solution of the Cyprus Issue.

1. Provisions of the “joint communiqué”.

In February 2014 Nikolaos Anastasiadis, President of the Cyprus Republic, and Derviş Eroğlu, head of the Turkish Cypriots, issued jointly a communiqué that forms the basis of bi-communal talks.\textsuperscript{191} Its main points are the following:

1. Solution shall be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation according to a principle of political equity.
2. United Cyprus shall have one united legal personality and sovereignty that shall be defined as sovereignty enjoyed by all UN member-states according to the UN Charter. This sovereignty shall include both Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots.
3. There shall be an unique Cypriot citizenship regulated by federal law. All citizens of United Cyprus shall also be citizens of the Greek Cypriot constituent State or the Turkish Cypriot constituent State.
4. The powers of the federal government, as well issues relevant to its set jurisdiction, shall be defined by the Constitution. The federal Constitution shall provide for power to belong to the constituent States. The constituent States shall exercise fully and definitely their powers with no interference from the federal government. Federal laws shall not contradict the legal order of the constituent States within the jurisdiction of the latter and legal order of the constituent States shall not contradict federal laws within the jurisdiction of the federal government.
5. Any dispute regarding the previous points shall be tried by the Federal Supreme Court.
6. The United Cyprus Republic shall emerge after approval of the solution in two different simultaneous plebiscites.
7. The federal Constitution shall be the supreme law of the island and shall bind all powers of the federation and the constituent states.
8. The union of the whole or part of the Federation with any other country or any other division or secession or any other unilateral change of the status quo is forbidden.

We should note that the UN Security Council welcomed the communiqué and congratulated the President of the Cyprus Republic and the head of the Turkish Cypriots. The Security Council mentioned that its members were encouraged by recent progress in the bi-communal talks and appealed to all parties to proceed on the basis of the relevant decisions issued by the Security Council in a spirit of good will, so as to reach a solution as fast as possible.\textsuperscript{192}

On the basis of the published data it becomes clear that bi-communal talks examine a plan not dissimilar to the fifth final version of the Annan Plan, as the latter was submitted to the judgment of the

\textsuperscript{189} K. Antonopoulos, op.cit., 68-96.
\textsuperscript{190} Paragraph V.4 was authored by Virginia Balafouta under the supervision of Professor I.Th. Mazis.
Greek Cypriot population in the plebiscite of the 24th April 2004, whence it was rejected by 75.8%. On the Turkish Cypriot side it was approved with a majority of 64.9% of those eligible to vote according to the “election catalogues” of the pseudo-State. Taking under consideration the special circumstances regarding the Cyprus issue, the various proposals submitted over time, as well as the critical views of the legal and political dimensions of these proposals and the problems arising after a possible implementation, we attempt in this study to examine fundamental aspects of the solution of the Cyprus issue.

Specifically, we claim that the three main pillars of the Annan Plan which are according to the joint communiqué the common basis of the negotiations are legal fictions. We attempt to establish this thesis by examining the meaning of these provisions vis-à-vis the ideas submitted over legal fiction in general. We clarify the consequences of the use of so many legal fictions in fundamental aspects of the Cyprus issue and point the possible negative influence of these on the functionality of the proposed model of state foundation and state government, taking also under consideration the specific context of the Cyprus issue. We also examine the ex ante legitimization of the aforementioned illegal situations and the ways solution of the Cyprus issue can proved to produce legal realities. We also review the subject of the continuity of the Cyprus Republic or its substitution by another entity and the repercussions of such a perspective on the international crimes committed by Turkey, as analyzed above. Finally, we analyze the central axes of Greek and Turkish foreign policy and their influence on the Cyprus issue.

2. Context and views on the legal fiction.

Initially we shall define the term of legal fiction and attempt to better understand the context and usefulness of this legal tool; at a second stage we shall present its use as far as Cyprus issue is concerned and the problems that possibly will arise. We establish our thesis concerning the legal fictions by examining the meaning of these provisions vis-à-vis the ideas submitted over legal fiction in general and especially by analyzing the definitions of legal fiction.

_Fictio juris or legal fiction is the legal means by which is exceeded a contrary positive or negative reality, in a way that the emerging legal effect creates a new legal situation and a component of another legal rule_.193 The legal fiction refers either to a real fact or to a legal relation or consequence and, through this, one attempts to overcome a legal or a real obstacle in order to create a new legal situation.194 It is thought that a legal fiction rejects legal truth in favor of lived reality.195 N.N. Saripolos in his essay ‘On the State and its elements in general’ claims that legal fiction is created ex nihilo in order to implement a rule valid for a specific case in a different case; it does not rely on reality, rather it is formed against any reality.196

According to Jhering, the legal fiction overrides the difficulties instead of erasing them, is characterized as an incomplete form in order to solve an issue and its very name is related to virtuality, i.e. an artificial necessary lie. A legal fiction is based on an easier path which leads to the same goal, thus facilitating progress by enabling it in an instance that science could not undertake a relevant construction.197 According to Bergel, regarding legal politics, legal fictions allow through their historical function the introduction without change of new rules in legitimate order through extension of terminology or through extension of the meaning of existing rules and concepts. Regarding their teleological function, legal fictions tend to protect or promote specific values and specific interests of property matter.198 According to Dekkers a legal fiction is a technical procedure that consists of placement of a fact, thing or

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194. Ibid, 4.
195. Ibid, 93.
196. Ibid, 153.
197. Ibid, 9.
198. Ibid, 100.
person, in the context of a consciously unsuitable legal case, in order to achieve a practical solution suited to that case.  

According to L. Legaz y Lacambra a legal fiction is a construction through which a hypothetical value is legally expressed, in order to facilitate a legal perception or the acceptance of a desirable yet nonexistent reality that is favored over the existing one. In this case, the question rises who defines legal reality, the lawmaker, theory, case law or natural law? In conclusion, the basic characteristic attributed by researchers to legal fiction is that the lawmaker constructs a certain legal reality that does not correspond to reality in order to facilitate a certain goal or that law accepts as a reality something contradictory to established reality or according to the older version that the law willfully distorts reality.  

Still, we should note that the legal means of fictio juris does not cancel existing empirical or legal reality, does not necessarily follow as a finding, while at the same time there can be no contradiction concerning the implicit in this rule relation between the condition and the legal consequence. If there was no contradiction there would not be the contradictory debate that forms the essence of legal fiction. This version of contradiction is totally different to the wrong version of reality distortion or of untruth as its essential element; contradiction in this context does not mean reality distortion or acceptance of untruth as truth and vice versa, but an act of exceeding the rival positive or negative form of empirical or legal reality through the formation of a new legal situation that is positively related to the goal pursued by the legal fiction. This contradictory relation is manifested only when the verbal expression of the established regulation cannot be rendered with another expression, through which its fictional form is diminished.

2.1 The meaning and the structure of federation as a legal fiction.

The primary element of federation which, as noted above, forms the basis of the solution to the Cyprus issue, is union of ethnic or other communities in a state and power distribution among these communities. Federal structure is the most functional choice, in order to avoid exclusion of a group that could lead to secession or bi-communal tensions and conflicts. A federation is composed of different ethnic, linguistic or cultural communities that wish to retain their autonomy in their respective regions. By accepting a common state these communities pursue their own goals and by their inter-communal agreement they aspire to create a stable conventional relation which along with consociation regarding decision making forms the basic functional elements of the federation.

A federation can be formed if two conditions are met: territorial definition of constituent entities and the will and agreement of those entities to unite, share power and define their relation in the context of the federation.

Federalism is a matter of political philosophy, not only of state structure; therefore it has to balance between the need of union and respect of autonomy and interests of each community.

A federation is the architectural model concerning the union of political entities with divergent views on exclusive sovereignty. A federation consists of the central federal government and the constituent federal states. The federal states enjoy sovereignty as the source of their primary power, they define federal constitutional aspects and enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in their respective peripheries. This division, as well as the sovereignty of the people, is a

199. Ibid, 102.
200. Ibid, 123.
201. Ibid, 114.
203. Ibid, 166.
legal fiction stated in the constitutional wording. Sovereignty of federal peoples is approved by the federal constitution separately for each state.\textsuperscript{206}

This presentation of the structural elements of federation shows that it includes the notion of legal fiction. Specifically, as noted above, the existence in the context of the federation of federate states with distinct sovereign powers –except that of the central federal government- is a legal fiction. Division of state entity into distinct entities and the coexistence of sovereignty and powers of these two entities alongside with the central administration of the federal state, as well as transfer of authority from these entities to the central administration is based on the notion of legal fiction. A new legal situation is being created in order to overcome legal or real obstacles (double sovereignty);\textsuperscript{207} legal truth is erased in favor of lived reality.\textsuperscript{208}

This invention applies the structure of a state onto a different structural situation. An expansion of the notion of state is made, so as to include a different real situation and to protect and promote the interests of the two communities. The two communities should act jointly, share a common administration and representation on an international level. Therefore, this invention presents elements of the definition of legal fiction provided by Bergel.

Distance between the communities is not an obstacle, rather the incentive for the creation of the federation.\textsuperscript{209}

This reality is consistent with the legal fiction, as if there was no contradiction, there would be no debate forming the essence of legal fiction.\textsuperscript{210}

2.2. The provision of transference of the structures of Cyprus Republic to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and of the structures of the pseudo-state to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State as a legal fiction.

Annan Plan was based on preservation of existing bureaucratic structures. The two constituent states in the context of the federation would be formed by the transference of the structures of Cyprus Republic to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and of the structures of the pseudo-state to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. This invention aimed at keeping the two communities apart and avoids details of everyday functions, thus preserving their mode of function. Specifically, concerning the Greek Cypriots the bureaucratic mode of state operation – a Brisih influence- is deemed effective.\textsuperscript{211}

These provisions will be applied -even if it will not be declared- in case Cyprus issue will be solved according to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. It could be argued that transference of the structures of Cyprus Republic to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and of the structures of the pseudo-state to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State, present in the Annan Plan, is a legal fiction. In order to create a new legal order, i.e. establishment of federation, there is a convention regarding transference of the structures of Cyprus Republic to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and of the illegal structures of the pseudo-state to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State, as was the case in the Annan Plan.

Transition from current reality, which includes the existence of a legitimate state and a de facto situation, to a new reality is possible through certain provisions; such a transition is possible with the use of legal fiction, in order to overcome reality in favor of a complex issue. The provisions of the Annan Plan included elements of legal fiction, as defined by G. Mitsopoulos, as it aspired to overcome a contradictory positive or negative reality, in a way that the established legal consequence creates a new legal situation.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{206} P. Liakouras, op.cit., 193-4.
\textsuperscript{207} G. Mitsopoulos, op.cit., 4.
\textsuperscript{208} G. Mitsopoulos, op.cit., 93.
\textsuperscript{209} P. Liakouras, op.cit., 90.
\textsuperscript{210} G. Mitsopoulos, op.cit., 166.
\textsuperscript{211} A. Syrigos, op.cit., 158-61.
\textsuperscript{212} G. Mitsopoulos, op.cit., 176.
Use of legal fiction in this case aims to create a viable and functional model of state organization that should balance and unite contradictory situations and rival strategic interests, as the latter are expressed and promoted by the foreign policy of each side.

2.3. Function of the two aforementioned provisions regarding legitimization of illegal situations.

We should note that the provision of the establishment of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, as well as the provision concerning transference of the structures of Cyprus Republic to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and of the structures of the pseudo-state to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State, legitimizes ex posteriori the illegal de facto situation of the pseudo-state.

In the first case two constituent states are established that are equal, i.e. the pseudo-state is legitimized and raised to the status of an equal state to the Cyprus Republic; the latter is turned into a constituent state and a community. Ex President of the Cyprus Republic Tassos Papadopoulos’ declaration concerning this negative perspective present in the Annan Plan was revealing: “I received a state that is internationally recognized. I shall not hand a community that shall have no right of international presence and shall seek protectors, in exchange for futile hopes and expectations and with the erroneous assumption that Turkey shall keep its promises”.

Acceptance of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation is equal to acceptance and legitimization of the division of territory that was illegally forced by the Turkish side. The de facto situation forms the basis of the solution. By recognizing internationally the geographical division, Turkish foreign policy does not succeed in its primary goal, i.e. division of the island; still it succeeds in its goal of promoting a bi-zonal and bi-communal solution.

In the second case, concerning the provision that the structures of the pseudo-state are transferred to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State, this equals to ex posteriori recognition of these structures. Non recognition of a de facto situation is manifested with the relevant non recognition of any structure or action that has its origins in that action.

The UN Security Council with its Resolution 541, issued on 18 November 1983, deemed the unilateral declaration of independence by the “Turkish Republic of Foreign Cyprus” as ‘legally void’ and demanded its withdrawal’, making an appeal to states worldwide not to recognize the pseudo-state and accept only the Cyprus Republic. The illegal situation in Cyprus has been raised as an issue by international and regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, as noted above, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the International Court of Justice in Hague in its decision (July 2010) concerning the declaration of independence from Kosovo authorities.

2.4. The issue of continuity or succession of the Cyprus Republic as a legal fiction.

A crucial issue, raised in the context of the Annan Plan, and after the release of the joint communiqué, that shall emerge in any case after a possible solution according a federal plan, is whether the federal state shall be the continuity of the Cyprus Republic or whether there shall be a succession of states. In the event that the new state is considered a successor of the Cyprus Republic and not its continuity, then Cyprus Republic would cease to exist and

would be replaced by the new state. This was one of the points that the British diplomat David Hannay thought that should be met with ‘constructive vagueness’. We should note that the Annan Plan lacked the fundamental element inherent in succession, i.e. territorial change, since there was no change of the boundaries of the new state in relation to the previous one. The fact that this new state, the United Republic of Cyprus would keep the spot of Cyprus in the UN is a point that shows the continuity of the state.

Another crucial matter that is not taken into account is the following: if the new state faces an internal paralysis, then continuity of Cyprus Republic would serve for its restitution in integrum. If on the other hand the Cyprus Republic is succeeded and disappears, then there would be no status quo ante and the period before acceptance of any solution plan would be tabula rasa.216

Furthermore, what would happen to the new state in case the Turkish Cypriots abandoned its structures, as they did in 1963? Could the law of necessity be accepted again, so that the Greek Cypriot constituent state and the federation are preserved? In any federal solution such a danger lurks to a degree and a harmonious coexistence is based on the goodwill of the two communities.217

The provision that the Cyprus Republic shall be instantly dissolved before the new state is established is a legal fiction according to legal typology. In this case it is a legal conception through which an existing contrary reality (the existence of the Cyprus Republic) is overcome, so that the legitimate consequence creates a new legitimate situation (the establishment of a new state).218 Therefore this provision lies within the definition of legal fiction offered by G. Mitsopoulos. It is created against all reality,219 thus fulfilling an element of the definition by N.N. Saripolos; it is an infinite form in order to solve an issue, thus fulfilling Jhering’s definition, as it is related to virtuality and states an artificial necessary lie. It also follows an easier way which leads to the same goal and facilitates progress, rendering the latter possible in a time that science could not create the relevant provision.220

The provision that the Cyprus Republic shall be instantly dissolved is also consistent with Dekkers’ definition of legal fiction, since it is a technical procedure that consists of placement of a thing in the context of a consciously unsuitable legal case, in order to achieve a practical solution suited to that case.221

Finally, the provision is consistent with the definition of legal fiction provided by L. Legaz y Lacambra, since it is a construction through which a hypothetical value is legally expressed, in order to facilitate a legal perception or the acceptance of a desirable yet nonexistent reality that is favored over the existing one.222

2.5. The issue of continuity or succession of the Cyprus Republic concerning the a posteriori legitimization of illegal situations.

The goal served by the legal fiction concerning the instant dissolution of the Cyprus Republic, before the new state is established, would be transition from an existing reality of legal state and a pseudo-state to a successive situation of a federation with two equal ‘partners’. In this case one seeks to overcome obstacles and contradictions, as the need to place on the same level an illegitimate and a legitimate situation.

It is obvious that, as in the case of the instant dissolution of the Cyprus Republic, before the new state is established, what is proposed is the a posteriori legitimization of an illegitimate situation, i.e. of the

220. Ibid, 9.
221. Ibid, 102.
222. Ibid, 123.
pseudo-state. The legitimate state is dissolved, in order for the successive situation to appear. Specific manifestations of the a posteriori legitimization of the pseudo-state include its right, provided by the Annan Plan, to submit a list of the international treaties it ‘had signed’ and acceptance by the new state of the public debt of the pseudo-state.\footnote{223}

International law imposes absolute condemnation of unilateral declaration of state establishment by the international community. According to the International Court of Justice ‘respect of territorial sovereignty is a fundamental basis of international relations’. Territorial sovereignty as a notion automatically leads to the notion of territorial integrity, present in Article 2, par. 4 of the UN Charter and thereafter repeated in many international declarations. Preservation of territorial integrity is achieved through inviolability of existing borders.\footnote{224} Article 2, par. 4 of the UN Charter forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of state. In that sense any territorial change as a consequence of illegitimate use of force is not legitimate, as declared in a series of resolutions issued by the UN Security Council.\footnote{225}

In the case the Cyprus issue is solved according to a federal plan, the pseudo-state is legitimizized to a degree due to the result irrespective of the consequence sought. A posteriori legitimization of an undoubtedly illegitimate situation, condemned by the whole of the international community, is a negative outcome, inconsistent with the principle of territorial sovereignty.

Solving of the Cyprus issue is related nowadays to other unilateral declarations of independence or union with another state issued by Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea, which are illegitimate, de facto situations. Legitimization of the pseudo-state by the international community would be a very negative precedent for international law, and it might “form an incentive” for related totally condemnable attempts.

Non recognition of illegitimate situations belongs to political and moral sanctions and is a continuous condemnation in case legitimacy is not restored. According to Antonio Cassese, \textit{as the international community cannot erase power, it is limited to not accepting it, when it is not able to achieve restoration of legitimacy.}\footnote{226}

\textit{The Security Council with its S/RES/353 (1974) and S/RES/541 (1983) Resolutions appeals to all states to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to not recognize the illegitimate situation of the pseudo-state.}\footnote{227}

We should also note that in the event of succession and not continuity of the Cyprus Republic, not only shall the pseudo-state be legitimizized, but there shall be a strong negative symbolism for the Cyprus Republic. Any sanctions imposed on the situation that violated international legitimate order are abolished; furthermore, the legitimate state –that has suffered insult of its rights- is actually being punished with its instant dissolution. Instant dissolution of the Cyprus Republic is a prospect of extremely negative historical, moral and political symbolism, since it interrupts historical continuity of the state.

\textbf{2.6. The issue of continuity or succession of the Cyprus Republic in relation to committed international crimes.}

One of the issues that should be examined in the event of instant dissolution of the Cyprus Republic, before the new state is established, is the possible consequences on the legal handling of international crimes committed in Cyprus by the Turkish side, as analyzed above. In general, we should note that the legal framework concerning state succession is quite limited. \textit{Current trends in international law favor}
continuity of conventional regulations. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1978 that examines succession in relation to international treaties, in the case of union of states, treaties that were valid for each state continue to be valid only for that part of the territory where they were valid before the union, unless a decision is met to expand them to the remaining part of the territory. There is also the general rule concerning respect of established rights of individuals. Legal cases concerning international responsibility are negative in this matter and the general rule is that there is no succession concerning illegitimate actions.\(^{228}\)

In the event of instant dissolution of the Cyprus Republic, before the new state is established, it is doubtful whether the international crimes committed in Cyprus by the Turkish side –which are not subject to prescription, as noted above– shall continue to exist. Since in case of state succession legal cases concerning international responsibility are steadily negative and the general rule is that there is no succession concerning illegitimate actions,\(^{229}\) it is doubtful whether the international crimes committed in Cyprus by Turkey shall ever be prosecuted and justice be restored.

One can thus easily understand the negative repercussions for the international community that would appear by a posteriori legitimization of an illegal de facto situation and by the ‘disappearance’ of the committed crimes related to that illegal situation from legal reality.

However, it could well be argued that even in the hypothetical case that Cyprus Republic would dissolved, Turkey would continue to bear responsibility of committed international crimes, since it exerts effective control over the pseudo-state, as analyzed above.

3. Main axes of Turkish foreign policy.\(^{230}\)
At this point we should examine the main axes of Turkish foreign policy which has influenced the various stages of the Cyprus issue and which still forms the basis of the Turkish approach. Acceptance of bi-zonal and bi-communal federation was an indisputable success of Turkish diplomacy, while at the same time to a degree it meant that the Greek side actually accepted a de facto situation. The Turkish side created an illegal de facto situation of two zones and two communities in Cyprus aspiring to legitimize ex post facto this situation.

Turkish strategy on the Cyprus issue was formulated in 1956 by Nihat Erim, Professor of Constitutional Law. Prime Minister Adan Mederes charged Erim with the task of preparing a report concerning political planning of Turkey on the Cyprus issue. The report prepared by Nihat Erim was adopted as a core policy paper by all subsequent Turkish governments. Its main points were the following:\(^{231}\)

1. Turkish claim for restitution of its sovereignty\(^{232}\) over the whole of Cyprus could not succeed, since it would not receive support at an international level. If Cyprus obtained self-government, then the best solution would be division of the island, so as to avoid worsening of relations between the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece.

2. The Greek Cypriot aspiration of Enosis, Union with Greece, would be counterbalanced by a Turkish demand for a distinct self-determination of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, thus leading to division. Turkey would claim that there existed two distinct communities, two distinct entities, each of which had the right of self-determination. The future of these two entities –independence, union with mother

\(^{229}\) E. Roukounas, op.cit., 449-62.
\(^{230}\) Paragraph 3 was authored jointly by I.Th. Mazis and Virginia Balafouta under the general outline posed by I.Th. Mazis.
\(^{232}\) Our emphasis.
homeland. Continuity of British control or other should be decided through a plebiscite by each of these communities.

3. The principle of self-determination would be implemented through the transfer of Greek populations, so that they could lie under the administration of their choosing. This transfer would hinder discriminations against the Turkish minority of Cyprus, would ensure security of Turkey and reduced the possibility of a future crisis.

4. Turkey should define the most beneficial form of division taking into account her economic and military interests, as well as the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. The region which would be conceded to the Greek Cypriots should be connected on a security level with Turkey, as this subject was linked to Turkish security and Middle Eastern security. Greece could not make an analogous claim over the Turkish-inhabited region, as Cyprus’ distance from Turkey amounts to 45 nautical miles, while its distance from Greece amounts to 600 nautical miles.

5. Turkey should facilitate migration of Turks to Cyprus, so as to increase the relative percentage of the Turkish population in Cyprus to the level attained during Ottoman rule. In this way there shall be no preoccupations for the outcome of the plebiscite concerning the whole of the island or division.

This strategy seems to be connected to the international crimes committed in Cyprus by the Turkish side.

This policy was based to a large degree on the Western strategy of containment towards USSR in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as analyzed in many articles by Ioannis Th. Mazis. In the same spirit, Professor Marios Evriviades writes the following: “In the context of this planning, the geographical space of Turkey (Asia Minor) would serve as an air base for strikes against the Soviet homeland, even with nuclear weapons. Similar attacks against the southern part of the Soviet Union were planned using the British bases in Cairo-Suez in Egypt and after 1956 in Cyprus. After WWII a special relationship between the US and Turkey was built, through bilateral and multilateral agreements, the integration of Turkey into Western-controlled institutions and the installation of American strategic weapons in the geographical space of Asia Minor. Billions of US dollars in economic and military assistance and over plus military material from all US allies, including Japan, were given to Turkey. Turkey contained the spread of communism in the Middle East and also acted as a military presence for Western-controlled institutions, such as CENTO, for control of the Middle East.

After 1948 and in the 1950s that special relationship between the US and Turkey would be enhanced including de facto Israel. For Israel this regional alliance belonged to the doctrine of peripheral strategy initiated by Ben-Gurion, so that Israel would avoid encirclement by Arab states. This strategy also included the Trident Agreement concluded between Israel and non-Arab and non-Islamic states (Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia). In 1958 Israel and Turkey signed a secret agreement including common defense against common enemies, as Nasserism and Arab socialism. From 1948 till 2002-2003 the axis controlling the Middle East consists of US, Turkey, Israel and the UK.

After the Suez Crisis in 1956 the British act as the US vassals per excellence in the context of the special re-

233. Our emphasis.
234. Our emphasis.
235. Our emphasis.
236. Our emphasis.
237. Our emphasis.
238. Our emphasis.
240. http://goo.gl/oxz0OY.
relationship between the two countries. In this US-controlled environment Greece, theoretically in control of vital geographic space influencing the strategic cohesion of the Mediterranean and the Middle East was deemed an ally of secondary importance. Understanding of this fact is crucial if Greece and Cyprus wish to overcome this fate, being allies of secondary importance to the West. The benevolent stance adopted by the US, the UK and Israel towards Turkey had serious repercussions. In times of bilateral Greek-Turkish tensions in international fora, Turkey’s elevated importance for Western and Israeli interests has damaged Greek interests in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus.

It is in this context that we should view the Turkish pogrom against the Greeks of Constantinople and Smyrna in 1955. In Smyrna the Turkish crowd insulted and attacked the Greek officers and their families without any official condemnation by the Turkish government, let alone the NATO alliance. Instead the US reacted with the demeaning letter by US Secretary of State John Dulles addressed to both Greek and Turkish authorities who requested that the whole incident be forgotten for the sake of the stability of the NATO alliance. The Greek government complied by not releasing the White Bible that was going to be published concerning the Turkish atrocities (This report remained secret for 50 years until it was published in the reference book The Mechanism of Destruction by Speros Vryonis Jr., causing irritation to those who promoted the so-called ‘Greek-Turkish friendship’).

The disruption in the Middle East in 1958 led to a hasty conclusion of the Cyprus Issue with the relevant Zurich and London Conventions. These assured the military presence of Turkey and the United Kingdom in Cyprus, while the Cyprus Republic emerged as a state without complete autonomy of action. The ongoing crisis in the Middle East (Iran, Nasser in Egypt, Suez Crisis, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon) reached its climax in 1958 with the Anti-Western coup in Iraq, which led to Israeli-Turkish strengthening of ties with the aforementioned secret agreement. Since 1957 the US and the UK aided by Turkey and Israel attempted to stage coups or assassinations against Nasser and the leadership of Syria. According to President Eisenhower himself the US blocked a Turkish attack against Syria and Iraq only in the eleventh hour.

Turkey gained thus the support of Western powers and obtained a kind of veto power to be used against Greece and Cyprus, emphatically used in the Annan Plan of 2004. Daniel Fried, a senior US official, admitted that the US actually ceded Cyprus to Turkey in the guise of the Annan Plan for its perceived support in the war against Iraq in 2003.

Concerning contemporary Turkish foreign policy Professor Ioannis Th. Mazis has shown in his monograph Davutoglu and Geopolitics the interaction of the views of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs with the general Turkish strategy. Davutoglu’s views were presented in his book Stratejik derinlik. Türkiye’ nin uluslararası konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s international position, Kure Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2004 [2001]. Central points of Davutoglu’s views concerning the Cyprus issue are presented, so as to show the main axes of Turkish foreign policy that should be taken into account during planning of a Greek strategic approach: “…The Aegean Sea and Cyprus are two important points in the direction connecting Eastern Europe and the Middle East on a landmass level and also in the direction connecting the Adriatic Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf on a sea level […] A country ignoring Cyprus cannot prove to be active in global and peripheral politics. […] Even if there was not a single Muslim Turk in Cyprus, Turkey is obligated to raise the Cyprus issue. No country can remain indifferent towards an island lying in the heart of its vital space. […] Cyprus cannot be ignored by any peripheral or global power that has strategic aspirations in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Gulf. Cyprus is so ideally situated in relation to all these areas that it forms a variable potentially influencing each one of these areas. Turkey should maintain its strategic advantage obtained in the 1970s; it should do so not in the context of a defensive Cyprus politics but rather as a fundamental tool of an offensive sea strategy in diplomatic terms”.

Map 21: Illegitimate Turkish claims over the EEZ of the Cyprus Republic

[Source: I.Th. Mazis & G.A. Sgouros]

[Source: I.Th. Mazis & G.A. Sgouros]
4. Greek foreign policy

The official recognition of the Cyprus Republic is a fundamental parameter of Greek foreign policy. At the same time Greece and Cyprus respect and implement all rules of international law order. If the Cyprus Republic is dissolved, in the stage before the new federate state is created, it loses automatically its most powerful and convincing argument, i.e. its recognition from the international community as the sole representative of the population of the island in the international environment.

Unfortunately the Helladic administrations after the colonels’ regime, acting under syndromes that they will be charged with interfering in the affairs of the Cyprus Republic, have adopted a rather ambiguous doctrine of foreign policy summed up in the motto ‘Cyprus decides Athens supports’. With the notable exception of two cases, the Doctrine of Unified Defensive Space (silently abandoned over the years) and the entry of Cyprus into the EU, this dipole of Hellenism in the South Eastern Mediterranean has not achieved so far to create a concrete foreign policy and a relevant geostrategic documentation.

The Cyprus issue fluctuates between an internationalization aspect and a de-internationalization aspect: the first consists of appeal in international institutions and international fora implementing rules of international law, as the United Nations-appeals to NATO are not internationalization, since NATO does not hold relevant jurisdiction over this matter. Non-internationalized approach is connected to intergovernmental activities influenced by national interests of specific NATO states (US, United Kingdom). This approach does not necessarily comply with the principles of international law and promotes political frameworks that incorporate structural institutional deficits and problems.

Greek foreign policy concerning the Cyprus issue should take into account international and European law, internationalize the problem, set specific goals in a hierarchical manner, balance between realist strategic goals and symbolic sentimental views, consider Turkish foreign policy and the events so far. At every historical juncture what is foremost needed is to achieve the best possible result in terms of national interest by using an adaptive high strategic approach. When this is not the case, blame should be put on tactics and not on the goal itself that was not realized due to mistakes and omissions. In this context we draw several conclusions concerning the mistakes made and how to avoid them in the future.

5. Conclusions

In conclusion, regarding the Cyprus issue the differences of view between the two communities and their will to preserve their autonomous being is the main reason for the creation of a federate state. Still, conflicts to be solved and difficulties in achieving an agreement and cooperation between the two communities are many and related to a multitude of variables; such variables are the history of the two groups, the intensity and the causes of their conflicts, their national, ethnic, religious, political and cultural character, their economic status and prospects of development, their relations and cooperation with other states and their position in the international environment in general.

In the case of Cyprus, joint efforts by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to create a common political modus vivendi, given also the relations between Greece and Turkey, is rather difficult for many reasons, as analyzed bellow.

242. Paragraph 4 was authored jointly by I.Th. Mazis and Virginia Balafouta.
244. S. Perrakis, op.cit., 461-74.
246. Paragraph 5 was authored jointly by I.Th. Mazis and Virginia Balafouta.
The relation between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious minority entered a phase of tension already in the 1950s due to British actions towards such an outcome. The establishment of the Cyprus Republic in 1959 after the London and Zürich Agreements was another landmark in the trajectory of tension, culminating in the crisis of 1963 and the Turkish invasion of 1974. In 1963 Archbishop Makarios, President of the Cyprus Republic submitted a proposal to revise certain articles of the Constitution; this proposal was submitted to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President and the governments of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain. The “13 Points” caused a serious intra-communal crisis that lasted for years. The Turkish invasion of 1974, occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory and international crimes against the Greek Cypriot population was the definitive event concerning the relations of the two communities.

Entry of the Cyprus Republic in the EU, acts of good will from the Cypriot government towards the Turkish Cypriot community in the occupied part has helped improve the relations between the Greek Cypriots and the indigenous Turkish Cypriot ethno-religious minority during the last decade. Still, this approach is being constantly interrupted from the consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation, from the fact that the international crimes committed have not been accounted for and from the violations of human rights protected by the European Convention of Human Rights.

Turkey creates problems in this process with its illegal policy of transfer Turkish population in the northern occupied part, with its continuous provocations in various issues, such as hydrocarbons, thus undermining any prospects of peaceful coexistence for the two groups in case the Cyprus issue is solved. This is obvious, since the demographic structure of the Turkish Cypriots has been altered and they have become a kind of minority in the general Turkish population from Anatolia that have been transferred during the last forty years. Greek Cypriots and the population inaccurately defined today as ‘Turkish Cypriot’ distance themselves concerning their common cultural and ethno-religious characteristics. In this way a spirit of conflict and division is reinforced in Cyprus.

According to Andreas Theofanous every proposal in the context of a bi-zonal or bi-communal federate state shall proved to be damaging in economic terms for the Greek Cypriots. That is why it is often suggested that the Greek Cypriots shall be compensated with an increase in the territory controlled. Specifically, the vast majority of the refugees should return under Greek Cypriot administration and at the same time enjoy the right to return to the region under Turkish Cypriot administration. Return of territories should ensure control of a great percentage of the coastline. 52,3% of the coastline of Cyprus is under Turkish occupation, 37,7% is controlled by the Cyprus Republic, while the remaining part belongs to the zone of the British bases.247

Another factor hindering a solution to the Cyprus issue is the British factor. Great Britain shares a great part of responsibility for the Cyprus problem; initially Great Britain tried desperately to preserve the colonial status during the 1950s encouraging clashes between the two communities and between Greece and Turkey. After the Cyprus Republic was established, Great Britain acted as a guaranteeing force for its bases in Cyprus and not for the independence and constitutional stability of Cyprus; in 1974 it did not absolutely anything vis-à-vis the 1974 coup by Ioannides and the Turkish invasion.248

Today the United Kingdom has “Sovereign Bases” in Dekeleia and Akrotiri in Cyprus since 1959; these bases actually undermine the sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic and are one of the worst remnants of colonialism.249

Such a status quo cannot be grounded on international law. It is worth mentioning that according to the Annan

Plan this status quo was not only preserved but also legitimized through special provisions; according to these the Cyprus Republic would not have the right to implement its rights of sovereignty in the sea region surrounding the bases.250

Concerning the international status of the two sides the Cyprus Republic is officially recognized from all states, except Turkey, while the pseudo-state has been condemned from the whole of the international community and is recognized only by Turkey. Furthermore, Cyprus Republic is a member of the UN and the EU.

A federation that shall be bi-zonal and bi-communal is actually a confederation.251 Confederation, which was always the strategic goal of the Turkish side, refers to distinct subjects of international law with distinct international legal personality that shall be bonded under an international agreement.252 Constitutional provisions based on a racial/ethnic division that disregard the democratic principle and the principle of majority instead of rendering the status of minority to the Turkish Cypriot community (18% of population) shall inevitably lead to state collapse. Provisions that deviate from the democratic principle of majority in favor of a framework of political autonomy based on ethnic identities prove to be dysfunctional since they violate fundamental principles of international law.253

Conclusively, we could claim that management and solving such a composite and multidimensional issue as the Cyprus issue is connected to law making. What is essential is that illegitimate actions and violations of international law should not be ex ante legitimized. Moreover, the solution of Cyprus issue could not be based on legal fictions.

Legal fiction is an important jurisdictional tool used in law; still, the establishment of a state that shall face so many contradictions, tensions, difficulties and conflicting interests could hardly be based on legal fictions. Fictio juris can be found in fundamental principles of a state, such as popular sovereignty, still the Cyprus issue is rather complicated, so that it could not be based on such an approach as attempted in various proposed solutions.

As noted above, the division of the state entity into distinct entities and the coexistence of sovereignty and powers of these two entities simultaneously with the central administration of the federal state, as well as transfer of authorities from these entities to the central administration are based on the principle of legal fiction. The provision of the Annan Plan (appearing constantly in the future to the degree that the basis of the bi-communal talks is the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation) that the structures and institutions of the Cyprus Republic will be transferred to the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and that the structures and institutions of the pseudo-state will be transferred to the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State is also based on legal fiction. Finally, the notion that the Cyprus Republic shall be instantly dissolved before the new state is created is also a legal fiction.

Regarding legal fiction it is essential to take into account the evaluation of legal fiction, cited above, that refer to its virtuality, to the fact that it does not erase problems but simply bypass them, the fact that it is characterized as an incomplete form that is used in order to solve an issue, the fact that it signifies an artificial necessary lie,254 the fact that it does not correspond to reality or that it contradicts established reality or is a distortion of reality,255 the fact that it places an event, thing, person or situation into a consciously unsuitable legal case, in order to achieve a practical solution suited to that case.256

Concerning the Cyprus issue, the necessity to use all those legal fictions, in order to create a political
model of administration for the new state may point to the actual future character of the new state and highlight its questionable functionality and ineffectiveness after its establishment.

6. Questions to be answered.
We note also the following:

1. All these data is not taken into account by Turkey, but also not evaluated properly by the Helladic and Greek Cypriot side, for reasons that remain inexplicable. The Greek side continues talks with altera pars as if the two sides were brothers in legitimacy! In this way we actually accept the fact of invasion and international crimes and seem to disregard our own legitimate national claims.

2. It should by now be clear that the creation of a Kurdistan that shall include parts of Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia in Turkey, a plan that could be accepted by the Erdogan government, shall raise the issue of possible compensation for Turkey; the latter shall include Cyprus, Western Thrace and Eastern Aegean Sea to the right part of the 25th meridian, as well the EEZ of the Kastellorizo complex. If Greek and Cypriot foreign policy are not ready to confront such claims, a disaster could well ensue.

Geopolitical analysis of the dipole of Hellenism in the Eastern Mediterranean should be thoroughly completed and in fact in a rational and organized manner. It is only this that the said dipole shall be able to draw the necessary geostrategic conclusions and serve national interests, as well as the interests of its allies in the SE Wing of NATO.

Maps 14 and 15 offer some examples concerning Turkey’s ambitions and its perception of international law, especially international sea law. These maps show that Turkey claims as its own three quarters of Greek Cypriot EEZ and seabed, violating the law of the sea and disregarding the existence of Greek SW seabed in the Kastellorizo complex. Map 22 shows that Turkish claims for research fields include a region that belongs to Greek EEZ (29,91%) and to Cypriot EEZ (69,08%). These are the Turkish claims today, even before a solution has been accomplished; one can imagine what Turkey shall claim after a so-called solution has been concluded (See also Map 23).
[Source: I.Th. Mazis & G.A. Sgouros]
What should we take into account?

i) the exact legal dimension and the consequent political and geopolitical gravity of these issues. Bicommunal talks to solve the Cyprus issue should be based on the principle of *a conditio sine qua non* on lawful restoration of legitimacy concerning the international crimes committed in Cyprus, as well as acceptance of the law of the sea concerning the dispute over the Greek EEZ, especially in the SE Mediterranean.

ii) Greece should exhibit the necessary decisive spirit, especially after Turkey’s provocative announcement in the UN of its illegal claim over the Helladic possible EEZ and over the ipso facto et ab initio existing Greek and Cypriot seabed (See Map 13).

iii) This geopolitical approach per se is a complete proposal of foreign policy in accordance with international law.

What is needed for the implementation of this geopolitical approach?

i) First of all, a functional organization and unity of Hellenism in mainland Greece and Cyprus.

ii) Second, completion of this analysis through common Helladic-Cypriot institutional tools and mechanisms and creation of mechanisms of geostrategic action. These would align Greek foreign policy and strategic planning with the interests of the allies, i.e. NATO, EU, the US etc.

7. Proposals for a fundamental geostrategic planning and diplomatic action.

How can such an approach be accepted by the Power Poles of the Supra-System? What steps are necessary?

- A clear ontological -therefore primarily geographical- definition of the geostrategic outlook and subsequent understanding by the Helladic-Cypriot dipole of Hellenism.

- Creation of a common national mechanism uniting Hellenism on a global level and mainly the Helladic-Cypriot dipole, in order to serve national interests.

- Support of this approach by a unified front of claims, in cooperation with all possible allies of Athens and Nicosia, temporary or permanent.

Common direction and action of Athens and Nicosia is possible only through these non-existent common institutional mechanisms. These mechanisms shall be based on a common centre of policy study and planning based in Athens and Nicosia. Such a centre could be based on two fundamental choices:

i) Creation of a National Foundation of Geographical and Geopolitical Mediterranean Studies (NFGGMS) based in Nicosia, with a branch in Athens. This foundation shall be administrated by members of the Geographical Association of Cyprus in cooperation with geographers/geopolitical analysts from Greece; both these groups shall form the Directors Board and the Scientific Board of the Foundation. The Foundation shall be administrated by a Directors Board in charge of its possessions that shall implement proposals of the Scientific Board. The Scientific Board shall include a Department of Geopolitical Studies, a Department of Geostrategic Studies and a Subdivision of International Law. The Foundation shall be a state organization, not a NGO. Its mission, prescribed in its name, shall include the study, description and prediction of power redistribution in its fields of jurisdiction, as well as planning of foreign policy and diplomatic actions for the Helladic-Cypriot dipole of Hellenism.

ii) The National Foundation of Geographical and Geopolitical Mediterranean Studies (NFGGMS) shall submit case studies to the National Council of Cyprus and to the National Council of Foreign Policy of Greece. Administrative, academic and legal structure of the Foundation shall be decided by a workgroup of five individuals under the supervision of a distinguished geopolitical scientist. This workgroup should include distinguished scientists from Greece and Cyprus in Geopolitics and International Law, as well as eminent diplomats of the two countries. Coordination of the said group shall lie with the
President of the Geographical Association of Cyprus. Proposals originating from the workgroup should become law of the Cyprus Republic after its approval by the President of the Cyprus Republic. If such an approach is deemed ‘not realistic’ by the relevant authorities, they could face a disturbing situation for national interests in the near future.

iii) Creation of a Department of Geography and Geopolitics at the University of Cyprus. This Department shall be established after a thorough and detailed proposal has been submitted by the Geographical Association of Cyprus and cooperating geographers/geopolitical scientists from Greece. This Department shall prove to be the most important pool for future officials of the NFGGMS and shall support the academic and research projects of the latter. The President of this Department should also be a member of the Scientific Board of NFGGMS.

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